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ABSTRACT
Empirical studies of online reviews have found that valence (average rating) has a
consistently positive impact on consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP), but volume does not.
Although two studies tried to explain this phenomenon using different perspectives (Wu and
Ayala, 2012; Sun, 2012), neither study can fully accommodate the consumer behaviors observed
by the other. This dissertation adopts a theoretical framework that can explain the consumer
behaviors observed in both studies as well as the varying influence of review volume at the
individual level. Specifically, several studies were conducted to investigate the relationship
between bidirectional online seller reviews (e.g., the eBay review format) and consumers’ WTP.
Essay 1 provides an extensive review of studies that investigate online consumer reviews
at the market, product, firm, consumer, and message level; special attention is given to the
outcomes of consumer reviews for both products and sellers. In addition, this essay establishes
the importance of the current research topic.
Essay 2 combines economic and behavioral theories of decision-making under
uncertainty to develop a theoretical framework. The framework proposes that review volume and
valence influence a consumer’s WTP through a weighting function of outcome probability.
Consumers with different preferences towards uncertainty will have different preferences toward
review volume, and for some consumers, such preference can change depending on the review
valence. Based on this conceptualization, the framework reconciles the current literature by
explaining the inconsistent influence of review volume both across and within individuals. The
internal validity of the framework is tested with an experiment and analyses carried out at the
individual level provide strong support for the proposed conceptual model.
Essay 3 establishes the relevance of this research for managers by applying the
framework to real market data. Due to the nature of the transactional data, a finite mixture model
ix

is used to estimate the weighting function, and hypotheses are tested at the group instead of the
individual level. A simulation study demonstrates the validity of using a finite mixture model to
estimate the weighting function and classify groups. The results of the hypotheses testing provide
adequate support for the framework.

x

ESSAY ONE. AN APPRAISAL OF ONLINE USER REVIEWS
INTRODUCTION
By nature, online purchases involve much more uncertainty than offline purchases.
Online reviews, a digital form of consumer word-of-mouth, provide a useful tool for reducing the
uncertainty of purchases. Ample evidence shows that online reviews have become an important
component of consumers’ purchase decisions. Nielsen’s 2010 online shopping report reveals that
online reviews and peer recommendations have become a key factor that influences consumers’
purchases, especially those of electronics, cars, and travel. Forty percent (40%) of online
consumers indicate that they will not buy electronics without reading online reviews first. In
Nielsen’s more recent report on advertising trustworthiness (2012), online consumer opinions is
ranked as the second-most trustworthy and second-most relevant form of advertising when
searching for information about products, trailing only recommendations from the consumer's
personal network. Academic studies also confirm the importance of online reviews. For example,
Bronner and de Hoog (2010) found that tourists rated consumer-generated review sites as more
up-to-date and useful than market-generated sites (2010). Utz at al. (2012) found that consumer
reviews of an online retailer are a more important indicator of trustworthiness than the overall
store reputation.
In contrast to traditional word-of-mouth, online reviews can be massive in scale. The
assessment of a product or seller is no longer limited to one or two customers’ experiences; those
assessments may come from hundreds, thousands, or even millions of customers. On the other
hand, in offline word-of-mouth communication, a consumer typically knows the communicator
and is able to judge the quality of the assessment based on that knowledge. Such personal
knowledge about online communicators is generally missing. Because of these unique
characteristics, online reviews have drawn a great deal of attention from researchers. Despite the
1

huge efforts that are devoted to this topic, we still lack a deep understanding of the mechanisms
that tie online reviews to consumer decisions, product or firm performance, and market
efficiency. My research goal is to explore how online reviews influence consumer’s price
decisions and provide insights for managers to better utilize online reviews to increase their
firms’ marketing performance. To reach this goal, I conducted an extensive literature review to
ascertain current knowledge about online reviews.

Method
The scope of this review is limited to consumer-generated online reviews about products,
individual sellers, and firms. The purpose of my research is to study the impact of massive
consumer reviews on consumer decisions, so I exclude research (1) that focuses on consumergenerated content in the form of blogs or social network platforms, because the impact of social
ties is not relevant to the current research, and (2) that examines objective third-party reviews,
such as reviews from consumer reports or professional organizations.
Following the call for multi-disciplinary research on e-commerce (Taylor and Strutton,
2010), I reviewed research in the following disciplines: marketing, management, information
science, and economics. I selected the top 20 journals ranked by ISI impact factor and the top 20
journals ranked by ISI 5-year impact factor in the categories of business, management,
information science & library science, and economics. The final list included 57 journals, each of
which I reviewed from 2000 to the present. The list of journals is shown in the appendix.
In the rest of Essay One, I summarize the current literature and explain my research
motivations. First, I briefly review the areas of research that involve online consumer reviews;
second, I provide a more detailed review of the outcomes of consumer reviews, for both products
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and sellers/firms; last, I discuss the studies that motivate my research topic and the structure of
my dissertation.

ONLINE USER REVIEWS
Websites commonly use two types of review systems. The first is a star rating system, by
which a consumer can rate a seller or a product using a Likert scale; for example, Amazon uses a
5-star review system, with 1 being the lowest value and 5 being the highest. The second is a
bidirectional review system that assumes that a consumer will provide a positive review if
satisfied and a negative one if not, such as eBay’s review system. Most review systems provide
statistical summaries of the reviews: review volume is the number of reviews received for a
specific seller or product and review valence is the average of the review ratings. Even though
many systems do not directly report the variance of reviews, it can be inferred by the consumers
in various ways, for example, by looking at the distribution of reviews. Examples of these two
review systems are shown in Figures 1.1.
In the following review, I organize the research based on focus and topic. Studies of
online reviews have very different emphases and scopes. Some studies focus on market-level
outcomes, such as the characteristics of review distributions in various markets and the
effectiveness of employing review systems to improve market efficiency. Some studies focus on
the product/firm level, exploring the generation and consequence of reviews for a specific
product or seller. Some research looks closely at the consumer or message level, studying what
factors motivate a consumer to post online reviews or what types of messages persuade a
consumer.

3

Figure 1.1 Examples of Two Review Systems

Market-Level Research
One stream of literature provides insights on the design of review systems. Through
modeling, experiments, and online empirical studies, these studies identify the conditions under
which review systems are useful for generating efficient economic outcomes. Bakos and
Dellarocas (2011) utilize game theory to demonstrate that an online reputation system is very
important for a market in which adverse selection exists; a reputation-based system helps sellers
and buyers learn about each other, benefitting both participants with high quality. They also
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suggest that reputation systems are very important for the professional services market, where
other endurance mechanisms may cost a lot and the service outcome depends more on the type of
rather than the effort by the seller. Introducing review systems can improve buyers’ well-being
and their willingness to trade in that market (Yang et al., 2007), and the larger the impact of the
review system on the transaction outcomes (rewards for positive reviews and punishments for
negative reviews), the more likely the sellers will be honest (Zhou et al., 2008). Within a
repeated-game setting, Yang et al. (2007) conclude that the mere existence of a review system,
no matter how simple, helps improve market performance. Dellarocas (2005) also find that a
simple binary review profile, such as eBay’s review mechanism, can stimulate maximum market
efficiency. Kumar and Benbasat (2006) argue that allowing a consumer to provide a review not
only improves the consumer's perception of the website functionality, but also strengthens the
social connection between the website and the consumer.
Even though review systems can enhance market-level honesty, dishonest behavior can
still exist. Yang et al. (2007) demonstrate that there is a correlation between a seller’s tendency
to cheat and her reputation; that is, the more the seller tends to cheat, the more likely she will
build a good reputation. Moreover, dishonest sellers can manipulate reviews at a relatively low
cost. Since reviews are anonymous, dishonest sellers can submit good reviews for themselves,
and bad sellers can still participate in the market by starting over with a new ID. Some studies
have identified the conditions that enhance or limit the effectiveness of a review system in
promoting seller honesty. Zhou et al. (2008) find that the effectiveness of review systems can be
limited if buyers are not motivated to review sellers after transactions. Aperjis and Johari (2010)
examine the number of past transactions that should be used to calculate a seller’s reputation.
They find that calculating the seller's reputation over a longer duration of time and a larger
number of transactions is more likely to make patient sellers truthful but less likely to make high5

quality sellers truthful. Finally, Bolton et al. (2008) suggest that encouraging market-level
competition can increase the effectiveness of a review system by building trust, and
trustworthiness, in the market.
To specifically deal with fraud in review systems, Abbasi et al. (2008) propose a
stylometric method for identifying a trader by analyzing he writing style of the feedback
comments she posts. You et al. (2011) also propose a set of indicators that can detect fake
transactions and puppet buyers on consumer-to-consumer auction sites. By comparing regular
and collusive transactions on a large Chinese auction site, they find that buyers for collusive
transactions are usually more active and have a shorter history than regular buyers, collusive
transaction items are on average less valuable than regular transaction items, and puppet buyers
are more likely to present detailed comments for collusive sellers.

Product- and Firm-Level Research
Research at the product/firm level has focused on four areas: (1) antecedences of reviews,
(2) changes of review structure overtime, (3) outcomes of reviews, and (4) marketing strategies
that incorporate online reviews. I do not summarize review outcomes in this section, providing a
more detailed discussion later in the essay.
Antecedences of reviews. Studies have identified factors that influence the volume and
the valence of product reviews.
Factors that influence review volume. One stream of literature explores the factors that
may influence the generation of online reviews, which has been shown to be associated with
market factors such as popularity (Dellarocas et al., 2010) and sales (Moe and Trusov, 2011;
Dellarocas et al., 2010; Feng and Papatla, 2011), firms’ strategies such as advertising spending
(Feng and Papatla, 2011), and existing reviews for the product (Moe and Trusov, 2011,
6

Dellarocas et al., 2010).The most intuitive factor that influences the propensity of reviews is
sales, since the greater the product sales, the more experience consumers have with the product,
and the more likely they are to post reviews for that product (Moe and Trusov, 2011; Feng and
Papatla, 2011). Examining market-level data, Dellarocas et al. (2010) find that consumers prefer
to post reviews for movies that are less popular and less successful; they also like to post reviews
for movies that have already accumulated many comments. Correspondingly, the authors
observe a U-shaped relationship between review posting volume and a movie’s box office
revenue, in which more reviews are posted for either very obscure movies or high box-revenue
movies. Feng and Papatla (2011) find that the amount spent on advertising for an automobile
brand is negatively associated with the number of reviews posted in the same year. Comparing
two data sets collected in 2001 and 2008, respectively, Chen et al. (2011) find that, in general,
there are more reviews posted for products of extremely low or extremely high quality. During
the early stages of internet use, the price of a product negatively influences the aptness of
reviews for that product. As internet use becomes more common among consumers, price
exhibits a U-shaped relationship with review volume: more reviews are observed for products
that either have extremely low or extremely high prices.
Factors that influence review valence. Li and Hitt (2010) propose that consumer reviews
should reflect their evaluation of not only product quality but also product value. In a study of
reviews for cameras, they find that, when controlled for camera quality, the average of review
ratings will rise by 0.16 (on a 1-10 scale) if the camera price drops by 20% and 0.36 if the price
drops by 40%.In a study of automobile reviews, Chen et al. (2011)find that, although price has a
negative but statistically insignificant influence on review ratings, it has a U-shaped relationship
with review valence in the early stages of internet usage, in which lower or higher priced
products tend to have higher ratings than moderately priced products. For experiential products,
7

review valence is found to be positively related to the number of product users (Yang and Mei,
2010).Koh et al. (2010) study the influence of culture on online review valence. In a review of
ratings for movies by consumers from China, Singapore, and the U.S., they find that Chinese
consumers are less likely than American consumers to provide extreme ratings. Correspondingly,
they observe a U-shaped distribution of review valence on American movie review sites, but a
bell-shaped distribution of review valence on Chinese movie review sites.
Review evolvement. Studies also examine review evolvement, most of them using
longitudinal data to capture the progression of review profiles over time. Li and Hitt (2008)
attribute the changes in product reviews over time, which usually follow a falling trend, to the
fact that early reviewers, who are also initial buyers of a product, self-select the products they
believe they are more likely to enjoy, and hence their evaluations tend to be more positive. The
opinions of earlier buyers, however, do not necessarily reflect those of later buyers. Li and Hitt
also find that when consumers use product reviews to form purchase decisions, they do not fully
correct the self-selection bias. As a result, later buyers’ reviews tend to be lower than early
buyers', and the majority of the reviews follow a declining trend over time.
Moe and Trusov (2011) find that increases in review valence tend to incite new negative
reviews and discourage the subsequent posting of extremely positive reviews; increases in
variance among existing reviews discourage the posting of extreme reviews; and an increase in
review volume increases the posting of reviews in general. Using book review data from
Amazon and controlling for book quality, Hu and Li (2011) find that later reviews for a book
tend to deviate from previous reviews. That deviation is more likely if the later reviews mention
the earlier reviews, the existing reviews have a large volume or a small variance, and the book is
not popular among consumers.
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Firm’s marketing strategy. Given the overwhelming evidence that online reviews
contain valuable information for consumers as well as companies, studies propose various ways
that companies can incorporate online product reviews into their marketing strategies. Chen and
Xie (2008) develop a normative model to show that firms should incorporate consumer reviews
when developing their communication strategies. Companies’ responses to online consumer
reviews should take into consideration the relative size of the expert consumer segment and the
cost of the product. Companies should release more product attribute information in response to
consumer reviews if the product cost is low or the expert consumer segment is large, but reduce
the amount of information if the product cost is high or there are not enough expert consumers.
Chen and Xie (2008) also suggest that companies should be cautious about providing consumers
the option to leave reviews on their websites. Such a feature benefits products when the novice
consumer segment is large, but can hurt the company when the expert consumer segment is
large. Several studies also propose marketing research methods or models that retrieve
information from online consumer reviews to provide insights for companies’ positioning (Lee
and Bradlow, 2011) and product strategies (Decker and Trusov, 2010).

Consumer- and Message-Level Research
Studies that focus on the consumer level explore individual characteristics that lead to
different behaviors in terms of posting and using online reviews. Many researchers also look at
individual review messages and identify qualities that make one message more persuasive than
another.
Loyalty to review systems. Wang et al. (2010) find that people tend to continuously use
an online review system if they have a high propensity to learn about and adopt online review
systems, and if they view review systems as very relevant to their personal needs and interests. In
9

a survey of online users, Awad and Ragowsky (2008) find that gender plays a role in the
perception of the quality of a review system and of trust towards a website. Men view a review
system as having better quality if it provides many opportunities for the consumer to post
opinions, if there is a high volume of responses, and if others participate. For women, the
response from and participation of others is very important, but the opportunity to post opinions
is negatively associated the quality of the review system. For men and women, the helpfulness
and ease of use of a review system positively influences their trust of the website and hence their
intention to use it, but women place more weight on ease than men. Park and Lee (2009) propose
that a consumer will use online reviews more and be more likely to be influenced by them if she
is more susceptible to interpersonal influence and has more online shopping experience. They
also find that the relationship between these personal characteristics and online review usage
behavior is stronger for Korean consumers than for U.S. consumers.
Review posting behavior. Additional studies explore what types of consumers are more
likely to post reviews. Usually posting behavior is associated with a consumer's personal
characteristics and experience with the purchase. Many studies have documented that consumers
who have the highest and lowest satisfaction levels are more likely to post reviews, which leads
to an under-reporting bias (Koh et al., 2010).
Henning-Thurau et al. (2009) closely examine the underlying motives of consumers who
post opinions. In an analysis of comments posted on a German opinion website, they find that
concern for other customers, the social benefit of affiliating with a virtual community, a desire
for positive recognition from others, the economic rewards from website operators, and a need
for advice are the dominant motives. These motives are associated with the frequency of a
consumer’s visits to the website and the number of comments she wrote. They also suggest that
firms can segment consumers based on their motives for posting opinions online.
10

Review adoption. Using a simulation of an online auction site, Wolf and Muhanna
(2011) find that consumers usually focus on review valence information and underweight review
volume. Moreover, they find that this bias is more prevalent for the star-scale review format,
such as Amazon’s, than for the binary review format, such as eBay's. Some studies suggest that
different consumers will process review information differently. For example, Lee et al. (2008)
find that high-involvement consumers tend to be influenced by negative reviews that have high
quality; however, low-involvement consumers tend to conform to negative reviews regardless of
review quality. Park and Kim (2008) propose that experts like to process information about
product attributes and infer the benefit based on their knowledge, but novices like to process
information that directly discloses product benefits. Hence, reviews focusing on product
attributes have more impact on experts’ purchase intentions, while comments focusing on
product benefits have more impact on novices’ purchase intentions.
Review message persuasiveness. As mentioned above, consumers provide reviews of
products and sellers for various reasons; their backgrounds also vary widely in terms of interest
and knowledge. Therefore, readers do not perceive reviews as equal in quality or credibility.
Many studies show that consumers do read more than the statistical summary of the review
profile; they also will read individual reviews and heed the authors. DeMaeyer and Estelami
(2011) document that consumers trust experts’ opinions more for goods, but users’ testimonials
more for services. Naylor et al. (2011) argue that consumers’ perceptions of the similarities
between themselves and the reviewers will impact how much they are persuaded by the reviews.
When information about a reviewer is missing, readers will infer that the ambiguous reviewer is
similar to them; hence, consumers tend to agree with reviews posted by ambiguous reviewers
more than with reviews posted by dissimilar reviewers. Lee et al. (2008) find that the influence
of negative product reviews on consumers’ attitudes towards a product is moderated by the
11

quality of the review, as measured by relevancy, reliability, understandability, and sufficiency.
Kim and Gupta (2011) study the emotional expression in review messages, and find that
consumers tend to attribute negative emotions to a reviewer’s irrational dispositions; therefore,
the expression of negative emotions in a negative review decreases its persuasiveness. However,
the expression of positive emotion in a positive review does not improve the consumer’s
evaluation of the target.
Consumers do not just care about the review content for product information; they also
care about the content of reviews for online sellers. Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) conducted a
large-scale content analysis of reviews posted on eBay, finding that the review text generated
significant economic value beyond the numerical ratings. After controlling for a seller’s
numerical ratings, they find that reviews that comment on a seller’s outstanding/abysmal
benevolence and outstanding/abysmal credibility will influence consumers’ trust of the seller
and, as a result, impact the price premiums charged by the seller.
Some studies suggest that consumers may choose to trust and rely on only parts of a
review. Yang and Mei (2010) find that for experiential products such as video games, consumers
tend to trust comments about search attributes but not high-level experiential attributes. Finch
(2007) finds that on eBay, reviews about the quality of a seller’s services such as delivery,
communication, and problem solving are very important for low-risk products, or new products
of low value. However, reviews about the quality of the product, such as its condition, and
whether the product is exactly as described by the seller are very important when there high risks
associated with the product, for example, used products or high-priced products.
Websites like Amazon.com and Epinions.com also provide rating systems for the review
itself. Amazon.com lets consumers indicate whether they feel a review is helpful or not, and
consumers can also comment on reviews provided by others. Epininons.com, a website that
12

allows consumers to review various products, uses two ratings to help consumers identify highquality reviews. The first rating assesses the content of the review: a consumer can rate each
review as not helpful, somewhat helpful, helpful, or very helpful. The second rating assesses the
source of the review. Each reviewer has a profile that lists all of the reviews she has provided,
and a consumer can choose to “trust” the reviewer or “block” the reviewer. Studies also analyze
the content of reviews to determine what types of reviews score highest on the helpfulness rating.
Message content, such as one-sided vs. two-sided argument and evidence presentation, and
written style, such as readability, comprehensiveness, and language intensity, are found to be
associated with the helpfulness ratings of reviews (Korfiatis et al., 2011; Li and Zhan, 2012).
Mudambi and Schuff (2010) also propose that while the extremity of a review and the depth of a
review influence the helpfulness rating, these relationships are moderated by whether the target
product is a search or experience product.

ONLINE USER REVIEWS AND THE OUTCOMES
In this section, I discuss the outcomes of online consumer reviews in detail. Reviews can
be written about products or sellers/firms. Research shows that product reviews usually provide
information about product attributes, functionality, and benefits (Park and Kim, 2008); seller
reviews usually disclose information about product quality, such as product conditions, as well
as seller quality, such as delivery and communication (Lei, 2011). The studies discussed in this
section focus on product- or firm-level review characteristics and outcomes. Specifically, many
studies investigate statistical summaries of reviews, such as review volume, valence, and
variance. Most of the studies explore the influence of online reviews on aggregate consumer
behavioral outcomes, for example, product sales (Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Chevalier and
Mayzlin, 2006; Li and Hitt, 2008; Chen et al., 2011), sales price (Melnik and Alm, 2002; Zhang,
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2006; Reiley et al., 2007; Wu and Ayala, 2012), product revenue (Basuroy et al., 2003; Liu,
2006; Duan et al., 2008; Moon et al., 2010), and firm's financial performance (Chen et al., 2012;
Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012). A few studies investigate the influence of online reviews on
consumer attitudinal outcomes such as preference (Lee and Lee, 2009; Khare et al., 2011) and
trust (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). I summarize the studies on product reviews and on seller reviews
separately.

Reviews for Products
There are twenty articles that directly test the consequences of product reviews. Seven of
those studies focus on the motion picture industry and examine movie sales and revenues. Other
studies focus on software, books, video games, digital cameras, beauty products, etc. The most
extensive study is one by Tirunillai and Tellis (2012), which involves 15 firms across 6 markets.
Table 1.1 shows that, in terms of sales and revenue, review valence has more consistent
influence than volume and variance; however, in terms of companies’ financial performances,
such as stock market return, volume seems to have more influence than valence. While Tirunillai
and Tellis (2012) find that review valence has no impact, Chen et al.(2012) find that it is changes
in the review valence, not the absolute valence, that affects firms’ stock returns.
Some authors also suggest the importance of looking at interactions between review
statistics and other possible moderators. Sun (2012) find that, for online book sales, there view
valence interacts with review variance, so that when valence is low, higher variance leads to
higher sales. Khare et al. (2011) demonstrate the possibility of interactions among review
valence, variance, and volume in forming consumer preferences. While many studies find that
negative reviews have more impact than positive reviews on sales and revenue (Basuroy et al.,
2003; Chen et al., 2011), Clemons et al. (2006) find that for beer, a frequently purchased product,
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high-end reviews actually carry more weight than low-end reviews. Increasing the variety of the
products in one category can also weaken the relationship between product reviews and sales
(Zhou and Duan, 2011).Another important aspect of product that needs to be considered is
popularity. Duan et al. (2009) find that review valence does not influence the adoption of popular
software, but it has a significant impact on adoptions of less popular (niche) software. Similarly,
Zhu and Zhang (2010) find that review valence and variance only impact sales of less popular
video games. Park et al. (2011) suggest looking beyond product reviews in a single market,
because consumers can visit different websites to obtain review information for the same
product. The authors find that the relationship between review valence and sales on one website
is influenced not only by the volume of reviews accumulated on that website, but also by the
volume of reviews for the same product on other websites. The detail results of these twenty
studies are listed in Table 1.2.
Table 1.1 The Impact of Review Volume, Valence, and Variance
Dependent
Variable

Review
Volume

Article

Review
Valence*
+
+
+
+ or NS
+
+
+ or NS
NS
+
+

Review
Variance

Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006
+
Clemons et al., 2006
Li and Hitt, 2008
+
Duan et al., 2009
Chintagunta et al., 2010
NS
NS
Sales
Moon et al., 2010
Zhu and Zhang, 2010
+
or NS
Chen et al., 2011
+
Park et al., 2011
Sun, 2012
+
Basuroy et al., 2003
, , or NS
Liu, 2006
+
NS
Revenue
Duan et al., 2008
+
Moe and Trusov, 2011
NS
+
NS
Chen
et
al.,
2012
NS
Financial
Performance Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012
+
NS
* For studies that also report the valence of negative reviews, I only summarize the impact
of positive review valence here. Table 1.2 provides the full results of review valence.
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Table 1.2 Summary of Product Review Outcomes
Article

Independent
Variable(s)

Basuroy,
Chatterjee,
and Ravid,
2003

Number of
positive
(negative)
reviews,
percentage of
positive
(negative)
reviews, and
review volume

Dependent
Variable(s)

Product(s)

Revenue

Movie

Chevalier and Review valence
Mayzlin, 2006 (5-star scale)

Sales

Book

Clemons,
Gao, and Hitt,
2006

Sales

Beer

Revenue

Movie

Liu, 2006

Review valence
and variance

Review volume
and
percentages of
positive
(negative)
messages

Source(s)

Results

Review valence (both positive percentage and
negative percentage) influence revenue.
Negative review number influences revenue
more than positive review number, but the
Variety and
influence of negative review number
Baseline.Hollywood
diminishes over time.
.com
Review volume has mixed influence on
revenue. In different weeks after the movie is
released, it has either positive, negative or no
impact on revenue.
Increase in review valence leads to increase in
Amazon
relative sales.
Barnesandnoble.com The impact of negative (1-star) reviews is
larger than positive (5-star) reviews.
Both review valence and variance are
positively related to future sales.
Ratebeer.com
High-end ratings are weighted more than lowend ratings, because beer is a repeat purchase
product.
WOM activities are most active during a
movie’s prerelease and opening week.
WOM offers significant explanatory power
for both aggregate and weekly box office
Yahoo! Movies
revenue, especially in the early weeks after a
movie opens.
Most of this power comes from the volume of
WOM (through awareness), not from its
valence (through attitude).
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Table 1.2 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Dependent
Variable(s)

Duan, Gu, and Review valence, Review
Winston,
volume, and
volume and
2008
revenue
revenue

Li and Hitt,
2008

Review volume
and valence (5star scale)

Sales

Duan, Gu, and
Review valence
Whinston,
(5-star scale)
2009

Product
adoption

Lee and Lee,
2009

Review valence
and variance

Purchase
intention
and
preference
for product

Lee and
Youn, 2009

Review valence
(positive vs.
negative) and
platform

Product
recommend
ation

Chintagunta,
Gopinath, and
Venkataraman
, 2010

Review volume,
valence (13Sales
item scale), and
variance

Product(s)

Source(s)

Results

Movie

Variety, Yahoo!
Movies, and Box
Office Mojo

Separate the effect of online WOM as a
precursor and an outcome of retail sales.
Both a movie’s box office revenue and WOM
valence significantly influence WOM volume;
volume in turn leads to higher box office
revenue

Book

Amazon

Sales are positively related to review volume
and valence.

CNET
Download.com

Product ratings have no impact on users’
choice of popular software, and have a
significant positive impact on the adoption of
less popular products.

Experimental survey

Review valence and variance moderate the
impact of product attributes: quality and
preference on consumers’ purchase intentions.
Review valence and variance moderate the
impact of perceived quality on product
preferences.

Apartment

Experiment

Review valence influence recommendation
intent.
When review is positive, the impact is
moderated by the platform of reviews.

Movie

Yahoo! Movies

Review valence has positive impact on sales.
Neither volume nor variance has impact on
sales.

Software

Windows
Vista and
movie
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Table 1.2 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)
Moon,
Bergey, and
Iacobucci,
2010

Review valence

Dependent
Variable(s)

Revenue

Zhu and
Zhang, 2010

Review volume,
valence (10item scale),
Sales
and coefficient
of variation

Chen, Wang,
and Xie, 2011

Review volume,
valence (5-star
scale),
percentage of 1Sales
star reviews,
and percentage
of 5-star
reviews

Product(s)

Movie

Video game

Digital
camera

Source(s)

Results

Rotten Tomatoes
and Yahoo! Movies

Critics’ ratings significantly influence movie
revenue during the opening week while
amateurs’ do not.
Amateurs’ ratings influence movie review in
the later weeks only when they are supported
by heavy ad spending.

NPD
GameSpot

Review volume has a positive influence on
sales of games.
Review valence has a positive influence on
the sales only for less popular games.
Review coefficient of variation has a negative
influence on sales only for less popular
games.
Reviews (volume, rating, and variation) do
not influence the sales of games without
online capability.

Amazon

Review volume has a positive impact on
sales. Review valence does not have an
impact on sales.
Percentage of 5-star reviews does not have an
impact on sales.
Percentage of 1-star reviews has a negative
impact on sales.
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Table 1.2 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Khare,
Labrecque,
and Asare,
2011

Moe and
Trusov, 2011

Dependent
Variable(s)

Review volume,
valence
(positive vs.
Preference
negative), and
consensus

Subsequent
Review number, preview
valence, and
posting and
variance
Sales

Product(s)

Movie

Bath,
fragrance,
and beauty
products

Source(s)

Results

Experiment

Interaction between review valence and
volume: when review valence is negative,
volume has negative impact on preference;
when valence is positive, volume has positive
impact on preference.
Interaction among review valence, volume
and consensus: when valence is positive and
volume is high, low consensus decreases the
preference; when valence is negative and
volume is high, low consensus increases the
preference; and when volume is low,
consensus does not impact preference.

A national retailer
website

Increases in review valence encourage the
subsequent posting of negative ratings, but
discourage positive ratings.
Increases in review variance negatively
impact subsequent posting or extremely
negative and extremely positive reviews.
Increases in review volume increase all star
level reviews.
The magnitude of such impact is larger for
negative ratings than for positive ratings.
Baseline model: review valence, volume and
variance all have positive impact on sales.
Deviations from baseline model (caused by
social dynamics): review valence directly
(positively or negatively) affects sales.
Variance and volume have indirect impact on
sales.
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Table 1.2 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Park, Gu, and
Lee, 2011

Review valence
and
volume (as a
moderator)

Dependent
Variable(s)

Product(s)

Sales

Digital
camera

Sales

Antivirus
software,
digital media
player,
download
manager, and
file
compression

Zhou and
Duan, 2011

Review valence
(5-star scale)

Chen, Liu,
and Zhang,
2012

Review absolute
valence
(unfavorable,
favorable,
Firm’s
andmixed) and
financial
relative valence value
(relatively
negative,
positive, and
neutral)

Movie

Source(s)

Results

Amazon
CNET
Download.com

The impact of review valence from a specific
website on a product positively interacts with
its own volume and the volume of reviews for
the same product from another website.
The influence of review valence increases as
its own volume increases, and decreases as
the number of reviews on another website
increases.

CNET
Download.com

The increase in product variety weakens the
impact of both positive and negative user
reviews, and this weakening effect is more
pronounced for popular products than on
niche products.

IMDb,
Yahoo! Movie,
TNS media
intelligence,
9 major US
newspapers and 5
major entertainment
publications

Relative valence influences firm value, but
absolute valence does not, and the influence is
greater during the prerelease period than the
post-release period.
For a given level of average valence, a larger
number of earlier reviews may attract more
investor attention and makes the deviation
from it less impactful.
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Table 1.2 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Sun, 2012

Tirunillai and
Tellis, 2012

Review valence
(5-star scale),
volume, and
variance

Review valence
(5-star scale),
overall valence
(positive vs.
negative), and
review number

Dependent
Variable(s)

Sales

Stock
abnormal
returns,
idiosyncratc
risk, and
trading
volume

Product(s)

Book

Personal
computing,
cell phone,
personal
digital
assistant or
smartphone,
footwear,
toy, and data
storage

Source(s)

Results

Review valence and volume have positive
Amazon.com
impacts on sales; standard deviation leads to
Barnesandnoble.com relatively higher sales if and only if the
valence is low.

Amazon, Epinions,
and Yahoo!
Shopping
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Review volume has a significant positive
impact on short-term and long-term stock
returns.
Number of negative reviews has a stronger
impact on returns than positive reviews.
Review valence does not impact stock returns.
Review volume and the volume of negative
reviews influence trading volume in both the
short and long term.
Negative reviews also positively influence
firms’ idiosyncratic risk.
Off-line TV advertising increases review
volume and decreases the number of negative
reviews.

Reviews for Sellers
When reviewing the literature on the relationship between seller review and outcome, I
found twenty-three studies that directly tested the consequences of seller reviews. Most of the
products studied came from three categories: electronic products, such as digital cameras,
laptops, MP3 players, and cell phones; collectable products, such as antique silverware, stamps,
and gold coins; and entertainment products, such as books and DVDs. Lei (2011) chose a unique
product to study: G-mail invitations. The nature of this product makes it possible to separate
uncertainty related to sellers from uncertainty about the product condition. This product is only
sold on the consumer-to-consumer market for a short period of time, and product condition does
not vary. The only uncertainty related to the purchase is whether the seller will honestly deliver
the product after the transaction (Lei, 2011).
Compared to research on product reviews, research on seller reviews focuses more on
one particular market, eBay.com (seventeen out of the twenty three studies use data collected
from eBay). One study (Wu and Ayala, 2012) tests the hypotheses with both experimental data
and eBay transaction data. Since eBay reports several statistics, measurements of seller
reputation show a little variation in the literature. The original eBay system allowed users to
leave feedback for each other after each transaction, and eBay would summarize the number of
positive, neutral, and negative reviews from unique users, along with a feedback score, or the
number of positive reviews minus the number of negative reviews left by unique members.
Weinber and Davis (2005) provide a snapshot of eBay’s original review profile. eBay later added
positive feedback percentage to user profiles. Positive feedback percentage is calculated as the
number of positive reviews divided by the sum of positive and negative reviews left by unique
members. A snapshot of an eBay review profile from2004 can be found in Zhang (2006). In
2007, eBay changed the calculation of positive feedback percentage by limiting the reviews
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included to those posted within a year instead of all reviews in a user’s history, while
maintaining the calculation of the feedback score. The cumulative counts of positive, neutral, and
negative reviews throughout a user’s history were no longer listed in user profiles. Figure 1.1
shows a snapshot of the newest review profile.
Many studies examine the impact of the feedback score, because this statistic combines
review volume and review valence. While the feedback score has a consistent impact on sales
and bidding participation, its impact on price is ambiguous. Feedback score has been shown to
impact the price of auctions for G-mail invitations (Lei, 2011) and MP3 players (Sung and Liu,
2010) but not pennies (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007) or magazines (Zhou et al., 2008). Even for
the same product category, Obloj and Capron (2011) find that feedback score contributes to the
price premium a seller can charge for cell phone auctions, but Huang et al. (2011) find no impact
on auction price. The mixed results suggest that ratings that combine review volume and valence
may not be sufficient for explaining consumers’ preferences towards sellers.
As the impact of a single feedback score is unclear, many studies separate positive and
negative reviews, using these two variables to indicate seller reputation independently. However,
results are still mixed. The table below shows that separating positive and negative reviews still
does not provide a clear picture of how seller reviews influence transaction outcomes, especially
price. A negative review number does not always influence price (Ba and Paylou, 2002;
Livingston, 2005), and the number of positive reviews can have a positive impact (Standifird,
2001; Ba and Paylou, 2002; Livingston, 2005; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Zhang, 2006; Reiley
et al., 2007), no impact (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003) or even a negative
impact (Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003) on price.
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Table 1.3 The Impact of Positive Reviews and Negative Reviews
Dependent
Variable

Number of
Positive Reviews
+
+ for 13 products
NS for 5 products

Article
Standifird, 2001
Ba and Pavlou, 2002

Melnik and Alm, 2002
Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003
Price
Livingston, 2005
Houser and Wooders, 2006
Zhang, 2006
Reiley et al., 2007
Sung and Liu, 2010
Bockstedt and Goh, 2011
Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003
Sales
Livingston, 2005
Melnik and Alm, 2002
Willingness to
Livingston, 2005
Bid
Park and Bradlow, 2005

or NS
+
+
+
+

Number of
Negative Reviews
for 2 products
NS for 16 products

NS
NS
NS

+
NS
+

NS

+
NS

Zhou et al. (2008) compare different forms of review ratings provided by eBay and find
that ratings that weight positive against negative reviews, such as review valence (the percentage
of positive reviews), are more effective than feedback score in influencing auction price. Hence,
to understand the role of reviews in consumers’ decision-making processes, it is very important
to look at the influence of review valence and review volume separately, as well as at the
interaction between them (Khare et al., 2011; Park et al., 2012; Sun, 2012).
Table 1.4 provides a detailed summary of the results from the twenty-three studies.

MOTIVATION FOR MY RESEARCH
My research is motivated by the fact that research on online reviews has generated
abundant information at the market, firm/product, and consumer levels; however, not enough
studies incorporate consumer characteristics when investigating online reviews at the firm or
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Table 1.4 Summary of Seller Review Outcomes
Article
Standifird,
2001

Ba and
Pavlou, 2002

Melnik and
Alm, 2002

Independent
Dependent
Variable(s)
Variable(s)
Number of
Final
positive reviews
bidding
and of negative
price
reviews

Positive review
number and
negative review
number

Feedback score
and negative
review number

Trust and
price
premium

Willingness
to bid
(WTB), and
price

Product(s)
3Com Palm
Pilot V

Experiment
and
18 products

Gold coin

Source(s)

eBay

eBay

eBay
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Results
Total number of positive reviews has a
limited positive influence on bidding price.
Total number of negative reviews has a
negative influence on bidding price.
Experiment study:
Negative reviews have a stronger impact than
positive reviews on buyer’s trust in sellers.
Trust mediates the relationship between
reviews and price premiums.
Product price moderates the relationship
between trust and price premiums.
Empirical study:
Positive review number has positive impact
on price premiums for 13 out of 18 products.
Negative review number has negative impact
on price premiums for only 2 of the 18
products.
Product price only moderates the relationship
between negative reviews and price premiums
Feedback score has a significant positive
impact on WTB and price.
Negative review number has a significant
negative impact on WTB and price.

Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Dependent
Variable(s)

Product(s)

Sales and
Number of
closing
positive reviews
price

Sterling silver
flatware

Feedback score

Price

Laptop, PC,
DVD, and
book

Dewan and
Hsu, 2004

Feedback score

Price and
probability
of sale

Livingston,
2005

Positive review
number and
percentage of
negative
reviews

Park and
Bradlow,
2005

Number of
positive reviews Willingness
and of negative to bid
reviews

Gilkeson and
Reynolds,
2003

Bruce,
Haruvy, and
Rao, 2004

Willingness
to bid, sales,
and price

Stamp

Gold club

Notebook

Source(s)

Results

eBay

Closing price is measured as the percentage of
the average successful closing price.
Number of positive reviews has no impact on
auction success, either no or a negative
impact on closing price.

eBay

Feedback score has a positive impact on
price. The influence of feedback score is
greater for low-price products than for highprice products.

eBay and MR

Prices are 10-15% lower on eBay than on
MR. Feedback score has a statistically
significant effect on auction price and
probability of sale.

eBay

The number of positive reviews has a positive
influence on bidders’ willingness to bid, sales,
and price, but the marginal effects diminish.
Percentage of negative reviews has a negative
influence on willingness to bid, but no
influence on sales or price.

A Korean internet
auction site

Number of positive reviews has no impact on
willingness to bid.
Number of negative reviews negatively
influences willingness to bid.
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Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Dependent
Variable(s)

Dewally and
Ederington,
2006

STDDEV and
negative review
percentage

Final
bidding
price (the
price of the
item sold or
the highest
bid if not
sold)

Houser and
Wooders,
2006

Number of
positive,
neutral, and
negative
reviews

Second
highest bid
plus
shipping
cost

Feedback score

Highest and
second
highest
bidding
price

Zeithammer,
2006

Product(s)

Source(s)

Results

eBay

The mean negative percentage is 0.502%, and
59.4% of the sellers have no negative
feedback.
STDDEV measures how uncertainty about the
negative portion by the standard deviation
declines as the number of feedback increases;
it has a negative impact on price, which
means that total review number has a positive
impact on price.
Percentage of negative reviews has a negative
impact on price.

Pentium
III500
processors

eBay

Number of positive reviews has a positive
impact on price.
Number of neutral plus negative reviews has a
negative impact on price.

MP3 player

eBay

Feedback score has a positive impact on
bidding prices.

Collectable
comic books
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Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Zhang, 2006

Number of
positive reviews
and number of
negative
reviews from
buyer, seller,
and both

Chan,
Kadiyali, and
Park, 2007

Review valence
(bidirectional);
% of negative
reviews

Feedback score,
number of
Reiley, Bryan, positive
Prasad,
reviews, and
Reeves, 2007 number of
negative
reviews

Ghose, 2009

Review valence
(5-star scale),
review volume,
% of positive
reviews, % of
negative
reviews, price

Dependent
Variable(s)

Final
bidding
price and
sales

Willingness
to pay

Final
bidding
price

Number of
days it takes
for product
to be sold

Product(s)

Apple iPod
MP3 player

Notebook

US Indian
Head pennies

Used laptop,
digital
camera, audio
player, and
PDA

Source(s)

Results

eBay

Review from buyers: number of positive
reviews positively influences the final bidding
price; number of negative reviews negatively
influences final bid and sales; no significant
impact of the number of positive or negative
buying reviews on final bids or sales.
Total number of positive reviews positively
influence final bid price, but total number of
negative reviews does not influence final bid.

A Korean internet
auction site

Review valence has a positive impact on
willingness to pay.
Negative reviews do not have any impact on
willingness to pay more than neutral reviews.

eBay

Feedback score does not influence price.
Total number of positive reviews has a
positive influence on price.
Total number of negative reviews has a
negative influence on price.
The impact of negative reviews is larger than
that of positive reviews.

Amazon
Marketplace

Review valence has a positive influence on
the time it takes to sell products.
Review number has a positive influence.
Percentage of positive reviews has a positive
influence.
Percentage of negative reviews has a negative
influence.
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Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)
Li,
Srinivasan,
and Sun, 2009

Feedback score

Dependent
Variable(s)

Willingness
to bid,
Antique
bidding
painting and
amount, and
silver plate
entry and
bidding time

Zhou,
Dresner, and
Windel, 2009

Number of
positive
reviews,
number of
negative
reviews, and
feedback score

Final bid
price

Sung and Liu,
2010

Feedback score
and negative
review number

Price
(winning
bid plus
shipping)

Bockstedt and
Goh, 2011

Product(s)

Review valence
(bidirectional)
Price
and number of
premiums
positive reviews

Digital
camera

iPod shuffle
MP3 Player

Nintendo Wii

Source(s)

Results

eBay

High feedback score encourages bid
participation, decreases bidders’ bidding
amounts, and encourages bidders to bid early.
The impact of credibility of seller is stronger
for bidders with more experience.

eBay

Direct counts (within the last 12 months) of
positive and negative reviews significantly
influence the final auction price.
Feedback score and the difference between
positive and negative review number within
last 12 months do not significantly influence
price.
The effect of negative review number is larger
than positive review number
Review valence (positive percentage) has a
significant influence on price.

Yahoo! Taiwan

Feedback score has a positive impact on
price. The impact of feedback score is
significantly different across reputation
quartiles; negative review number does not
have impact on price.

eBay

Total number of positive reviews is
significantly associated with higher price
premiums. Review valence does not have a
significant effect on price premiums because
of a large concentration of high positive
percentages.
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Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)
Huang, Chen
and Lu, 2011

Feedback score

Lei, 2011

Feedback score
and
Feedback score
related to
selling gmail
invitation

Obloj and
Capron, 2011

Seller review
difference

Dependent
Variable(s)
Auction
success and
winning
price

Sales and
final
bidding
price

Price
premium
(difference
in price)

Product(s)

Nokia 8250

Gmail
invitation

New mobile
phone

Source(s)

Results

Yahoo!

Feedback score significantly affects auction
success, but not auction price.

eBay

Feedback score has a positive impact on
probability of sales and price.
The squared feedback score has a negative
impact on price.
Feedback score related to selling Gmail
invitation has no impact on price.

Polish internet
auction site

Seller review difference is the difference in
feedback scores between seller and
competitor divided by the sum of feedback
scores.
The price premium a reputable seller can
charge increases with the size of the
reputation gap (the difference in reputation)
between the seller and its matched competitor,
but with a diminishing rate.
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Table 1.4 Continued
Independent
Article
Variable(s)

Wu and
Ayala, 2012

Seller review
valence
(bidirectional)
and volume

Dependent
Variable(s)

Product(s)

Willingness
to pay
DVD set and
iPod
(absolute
and relative)

Source(s)

Experiment and
eBay
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Results
Experimental data results:
Review volume has no impact on absolute
willingness to pay, and it has a positive
impact on relative willingness to pay for riskaverse and risk-neutral consumers, but no
impact for risk-seeking consumers.
Review valence has a positive impact on both
absolute and relative willingness to pay for all
consumers.
Product price has a positive impact on
absolute willingness to pay; it has a negative
impact on relative willingness to pay for riskneutral consumers, but no impact for riskaverse or risk-seeking consumers.
Empirical data results:
Review volume has no impact on absolute or
relative willingness to pay for risk-averse and
risk-seeking consumer, but a positive impact
for risk-neutral consumers.
Review valence has positive impacts on both
absolute and relative willingness to pay for all
consumers
Product price has a positive impact on
absolute willingness to pay for all consumers;
it has a negative impact on relative
willingness to pay for risk-averse consumers,
no impact for risk-neutral consumers, and a
positive impact for risk-seeking consumers.

market level. Especially with respect to review outcomes, a review of the literature indicates
large inconsistencies in empirical results and conclusions. As mentioned by Wu and Ayala
(2012), at the market or product level, variations cannot fully explain the inconsistency. The
influence of online reviews must be understood from the consumer’s standpoint, and that
understanding should be incorporated into managing online reviews at the product and firm
level.
To the best of my knowledge, Wu and Ayala (2012) is the first study that theorizes the
influence of online reviews and consumer differences in price decisions, and investigates the
impact of reviews at the consumer/individual level. They draw a theoretical framework from
classical expected utility theory and incorporate seller’s review volume and valence into
consumers’ judgment of risk level associated with the purchase. They propose that review
volume and valence independently and directly impact a consumer’s judgment of purchase risk,
which influences the price she is willing to pay for the seller. Because consumers can have
different risk attitudes, for example, risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking, reviews have
different effects on willingness to pay. Review valence should always positively influence a
consumer’s willingness to pay, but the influence of review volume varies across consumer
segments based on risk attitude. For risk-averse consumers, review volume has a positive impact
on willingness to pay; for risk-neutral consumers, volume has no impact;and for risk-seeking
consumers, volume has a negative impact.
Sun (2012) studies consumer heterogeneity from another perspective. She assumes that
all consumers are risk neutral, but differ in their taste for the product. In contrast toWu and
Ayala’s (2012) research, she does not address how the difference in taste leads to different
behaviors from consumers. In other words, she does not investigate the impact of heterogeneity
at the consumer/individual level, but only uses the existence of heterogeneity to explain how
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review variances interact with valence in influencing product sales at the firm/product level.
Although Sun (2012) does not investigate the impact of online reviews across heterogeneous
consumer segments, she makes an observation at the aggregated level that cannot be explained
by Wu and Ayala’s (2012) framework.
Motivated by these studies, I develop a framework that will combine the strengths of both
perspectives. First, consistent with the study by Wu and Ayala (2012), I incorporate consumerlevel characteristics and look at different behaviors across consumers. Second, my framework
can accommodate consumer behavior that leads to the interactions observed by Sun
(2012).Third, my framework not only can account for the interactions between review valence
and variance, but also can explain the three-way interactions between review valence, variance,
and volume as documented by Khare et al. (2011). As a result, my framework predicts that
online reviews can have opposite outcomes not only across consumers, but also within
consumers.
Specifically, I focus on exploring the bidirectional review system and how it is used by
consumers to shape their willingness to pay for sellers with different review profiles. The
following considerations play a part in my focus.
First, online seller reviews are the most important online user reviews. Consumers can
obtain information about products from other channels; for example, a consumer can visit local
stores to check out the product and then purchase online. However, for sellers, most of the time
consumers do not have comparable opportunities offline and online reviews become the main
source of information. Wu et al. (2012) find that consumers perceive more uncertainty relating to
online sellers than to products. The impact of online reviews should be more salient for sellers
than for products, if not the same. So seller reviews are a good starting point for studying online
reviews.
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Second, bidirectional review is the most popular system used in online seller reviews.
Each bidirectional review follows a Bernoulli distribution and a sample of reviews follows a
binomial distribution (Wu and Ayala, 2012). Only volume and valence are important, because
review variance is fully determined by the volume and valence. For a star-scale review system,
review volume, valence, and variance are independent, and all three statistics are relevant when
analyzing the characteristics of reviews. It makes sense to first analyze the impact of online
reviews with respect to two variables, and then move to three variables.
Third, as mentioned above, studies of the relationship between seller reviews and sale
price have found the most inconsistent results. I also find that studying the impact on price is
more interesting because, as consumers, we can always make decisions on whether to purchase,
either offline or online, but we do not have the freedom to make decisions on price for offline
purchases. Online purchases provide a great opportunity for directly studying consumers’ price
decisions, or their willingness to pay, and can provide firms with insights that would be hard to
obtain in offline settings.
My dissertation is organized as follows. In Essay Two, I describe the development of my
theoretical framework and test its internal validity with an experimental study. In Essay Three, I
test the external validity of my framework using a dataset of online transactions.
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ESSAY TWO. ONLINE REVIEWS AND CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS
TO PAY: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND AN EXPERIMENTAL
INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Essay One, my research will explore how a bidirectional review for a
seller influences consumers’ purchase decisions. More specifically, my study will focus on how
a seller’s review number (volume) and percentage of positive reviews (valence) influence
consumers’ willingness to pay.
A review of the literature reveals that empirical studies have generated mixed results
concerning the relationship between seller review statistics and the price a seller can charge. A
closer look at these studies shows that the measurements related to review volume, such as
feedback scores, number of positive reviews, and number of negative reviews, all have
inconsistent influences on price. On the other hand, review valence has shown a relatively
consistent influence. As shown in Table 2.1,only one study finds that review valence has no
significant impact on price; however, Bockstedt and Goh (2011) explain that this result may be
due to the large concentration of high review valence in the dataset. Similar findings are
documented by Wu and Ayala (2012), who find that review valence consistently influences
price, but the impact of review volume is ambiguous.
Table 2.1 The Impact of Review Valence on Price
Article
Livingston, 2005
Chan et al., 2007
Ghose, 2009
Bockstedt and Goh, 2011
Wu and Ayala, 2012

% of Positive Reviews (Valence)
+
+
NS
+
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% of Negative Reviews
NS

Several studies try to provide theoretical explanations for the mixed results observed in
empirical studies. The authors break down the aggregate data to directly examine at segment or
even the individual level for possible explanations, postulating a relationship between seller
reviews and consumers’ willingness to pay. They propose that heterogeneity across consumers
may explain the ambiguous relationship between online seller reviews, especially review
volume, and the price of the product.
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001) assume that, although all consumers are risk averse, they
may differ in degree, and find that review volume and valence have an impact on price only for
those consumers who are highly risk averse. Wu and Ayala (2012) and Wu et al. (2012) relax
such a restriction and assume that consumers can be risk averse, risk neutral, or even risk
seeking. If a consumer is risk averse, she will always prefer sellers with a large review volume; if
a consumer is risk seeking, she will always prefer sellers with a small review volume; and if a
consumer is risk neutral, she basically does not care about review volume. The common theme
among these studies is that they use classic expected utility theory as a framework. Under such a
framework, the preference towards risk or uncertainty (hence preference towards review volume)
can vary across individuals but should be consistent within an individual. However, studies in
other contexts such as insurance, warranties (Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1992), and financial
assets (Sarin and Weber, 1993) have found that consumers change their preferences towards
uncertainty depending on the probability of obtaining an outcome. I am interested in exploring
whether such a change in preference will also occur when the purchase is made from online
sellers. Thus, I hope to extend previous studies and provide further explanations for the impact of
online seller reviews on willingness to pay by proposing that differences in preference towards
uncertainty (hence towards review volume) not only exists across individuals, but also exists
within an individual (at least for some consumers).
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In the rest of Essay Two, I discuss the theoretical frameworks that model people’s
preference towards uncertainty, state specific hypotheses, present an experimental study, and,
finally, propose an approach for testing the external validity of my framework.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Hereafter, I use the word “prospect” to represent a gamble-like problem. The remainder
of this essay focuses on a prospect with two outcomes: obtaining outcome x if event E happens
and outcome 0 if E does not. Let p be the true probability of event E, and a person will make
decisions based on her assessment of the overall value of the prospect (x, p; 0, 1-p). There is a
risk associated with outcome x when p is not 0 or 1;that is, we are not sure to obtain outcome x or
0. Many studies extend the concept of uncertainty using a more general framework in which not
only is the outcome uncertain, the probability of each outcome is also ambiguous. Motivated by
observations first documented by Ellsberg (1961), researchers have focused their efforts on
theorizing decision rules that account for uncertainty generated partly by the risk of an unsure
outcome and partly by the ambiguity concerning the probability of each possible outcome (Kahn
and Sarin, 1988; Hoarth and Einhorn, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Fox and Tversky,
1995; Kilka and Weber, 2001).

Modeling Decisions under Uncertainty
The framework of expected utility theory. Expected utility theory holds that the overall value of the prospect is
[
where

]

is the expected utility function and U(•) is the utility function with U(0)=0.
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Generally speaking, expected utility theory assumes that a person’s rational decisionmaking process follows certain assumptions (named axioms), and that under these assumptions
we can obtain numeric measures of her utility assessments of a prospect’s outcomes. A person
will make decisions based on the utilities and probabilities of prospect’s outcomes (Weber and
Camerer, 1987; Hastie and Dawes, 2001).
The framework of prospect theory (PT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
Human behaviors that violate the assumptions of expected utility theory motivated the
development of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To accommodate these
behavioral patterns, prospect theory proposes separating the value and weighting functions when
judging the overall value of a prospect.

where

is the value function of an outcome and

, and

is the weighting

function for the stated probability.
The properties of value function

. Prospect theory holds that the value of an outcome

conforms to a concept of “changes in wealth or welfare.”A person does not measure the value of
an outcome based on its final state, but rather on the difference between the final state and the
current state of that person. Thus, the value function involves two aspects:“the asset position that
serves as reference point and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative) from that
reference point”(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 page 277).Specifically, the value function is
defined as generally concave for gains-outcomes’ final states positively deviate from the
reference point and convex for losses-outcomes’ final states negatively deviate from the
reference point, and is steeper for losses than for gains. The shape of the value function is shown
below.
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Value

Value Function

Losses

Gains

Source: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979

Figure 2.1 Value Function of Prospect Theory

Since the value function is different for gains than for losses, a separation of decisions
under gains and under losses becomes necessary. This separation can be achieved using gainand loss-framing. In gain-framing, information is presented as a positive outcome as compared to
a person’s current state, with the associated probabilities, while in loss-framing, information is
presented as a negative outcome. Examples of gain-framing and loss-framing are shown below.
Table 2.2 Examples of Decision Framings
Decision Scenario

A Gain Framing

A Loss Framing

Surgery
(Compare to
Radiation Therapy)

Of 100 people having surgery 90
live through the post-operative
period, 68 are alive at the end of
the first year and 34 are alive at
the end of five years.

Of 100 people having surgery
10 die during surgery or the
post-operative period, 32 die
by the end of the first year and
66 die by the end of five years.

Gambles
25% chance to gain $1000 and
75% chance to lose $1000 and
(Compare to A Sure
75% chance to gain nothing
25% chance to lose nothing
Gain/ Loss)
Source: Tversky and Kahneman, 1986
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The properties of weighting function

. Prospect theory transforms stated

probabilities into decision weights that measure “the impact of events on the desirability of
prospects” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 page 280). The weighting function is an increasing
function of stated probability with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. The slope of the weighting function
measures the sensitivity of a person’s preference towards the change in probability. Prospect
theory describes several properties of weighting function: (1) overweighting: people tend to
overweight very low probabilities, (2) subcertainty: the sum of weights associated with
complementary events is generally less than the weight associated with the certain event, and (3)
subproportionality: for a fixed ratio of probabilities, the ratio of corresponding decision weights
is closer to unity when the probabilities are low. Based on these properties, a weighting function
should have the shape shown in Figure 2.2.

Decision Weight

1

0

Stated Probability

1

Source: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979

Figure 2.2 Weighting Function of Prospect Theory
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In the more general uncertainty framework, additional uncertainty results from missing or
ambiguous information about outcome probability p; hence, researchers usually use the
weighting function to account for this type of uncertainty. In an update of prospect theory,
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) point out that the weighting function in the original theory does
not always satisfy stochastic dominance, cannot account for situations where outcome
probabilities are unclear, and cannot be well extended to prospects with a large number of
outcomes. To overcome these limitations, they re-frame the concept of prospect theory using
rank-dependent utility theory, naming it cumulative prospect theory. Cumulative prospect theory
allows for separate weighting functions for gains and losses. The decision weight associated with
an outcome is interpreted as a marginal contribution of the outcome. Specifically, the decision
weight associated with a positive outcome xi is the difference between the capacities of events
with the outcome that is “at least as good as xi” and of events with the outcome that is “strictly
better than xi”(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 page 301)The decision weight associated with a
negative outcome is the difference between the capabilities of the events with the outcome that is
“at least as bad as xi” and of events with the outcome that is “strictly worse than xi”(Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992 page 301). However, when a prospect has two non-mixed outcomes, both
positive or both negative, cumulative prospect theory and the original prospect theory yield the
same prediction, because, under these conditions, original prospect theory is rank dependent.
Cumulative prospect theory proposes that the weighting function should satisfy both
lower subadditivity, “the impact of an event A is greater when it is added to a null event than
when it is added to some nonnull event B” (Tversky and Fox, 1995 page 270), and upper
subadditivity, “the impact of an event A is greater when it is subtracted from the certain event
than when it is subtracted from some uncertain event
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”( Tversky and Fox, 1995 page 271).

These characteristics lead to a reversely S-shaped weighting function, which holds that people
tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities.

Decision Weight

1

0

Stated Probability

1

Source: Tversky and Kahneman, 1992

Figure 2.3 Weighting Function of Cumulative Prospect Theory

Tversky and Fox (1995) test the characteristics of the weighting function in the more
general uncertainty situations in which ambiguity about outcome probability exists, and they find
that both lower and upper subadditivities apply to the more general uncertainty, and such effects
are amplified when outcome probabilities are unclear. The smooth function used to fit the
weighting function in the cumulative prospect theory is shown below. The same form of the
weighting function also has been tested by many other studies (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Prelec,
1998; Schimdt et al., 2008).

where p’ is the stated probability, and

is the parameter that influences the shape of the

weighting function and can be set to different values for gains versus losses.
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Other frameworks for decisions under uncertainty. Kahn and Sarin (1988) extend
subjective utility theory (which is an extension of classic expected utility theory) and propose a
decision model that depends on the entire distribution of p, assuming p is a random variable.
denote the density of the random variable p and ̅ is the average of p. Then the

Let

over-all value of the prospect

is:
̅

√∫

̅

∫

̅

[

̅ ]

is the standard deviation of the random variable p, and λ is a

person’s attitude towards uncertainty about probabilities. Using a first-order Taylor
[

approximation of

̅ ]

, the weighting function w(p) can be expressed by the first-order

approximation
̅
The weighting function states that the subjective probability of event E is deviated from
average probability ̅ and that the deviation is related to the standard deviation of the random
variable p.
The framework proposed by Einhorn and Hogarth (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, 1986;
Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990) is built on an idea similar to prospect theory. The authors propose
that a person may take an anchoring-and adjustment strategy. When the true probability p of
event E (hence the outcome) is unknown, a person can start with an anchor, such as the stated
probability

, and then make either an upwards or downwards adjustment based on the level of

probability, amount of uncertainty perceived, and the person’s attitude towards uncertainty about
probabilities. The weighting function is expressed as follows:
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where θ (

is the absolute size of adjustment and β is the attitude towards uncertainty

about probabilities. β> 1 implies that a person places more weight on probabilities that are larger
than

and that

is larger than

for most of the range of

.In contrast, β <1 implies that a

person places more weight on probabilities that are smaller than

and that

is smaller than

for most of the range.

Subjective Probability

1

a

b

0

Subjective Probability

1

Payoff Size: a<b

Source: Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985

Figure 2.4 Weighting Function of Einhorn and Hogarth’s Model

Many researchers have proposed other smooth models to describe a reversely S-shaped
weighting function. For example, Prelec (1998) proposes an exponential function with either one
parameter or two parameters; Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose a nonparametric estimation of
weighting function at individual level, and by using this method they find that a two-parameter
“linear in log odds model” weighting function was superior than one-parameter model in the
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domain of gains, one of which represents how a subject discriminates probability and the other of
which measures how attractive the gambling is.
The difference between expected utility theory and the behavioral theories discussed
above is that under expected utility theory, the overall value of a prospect is determined by the
true probability p, which is assessed by the stated sample probability

through a mean-variance

model. Behavior theories argue that when information about pis missing, people in general
experience extra uncertainty resulted from the ambiguity of probability. They propose nonlinear
transformations from the stated probability

to a subjective weight, either a decision weight that

measures the desirability of event E (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1996;
Prelec, 1998) or a subjective probability that measures subjective likelihood of event E (Einhorn
and Hogarth 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988). Depending on the shape of the transformation
function, a person may overweight or underweight probabilities based on the level of the stated
probability. The magnitude of overweighting/underweighting is related to various factors. If the
stated probability

comes from a sample used to estimate the true probability of an outcome,

then the size of the sample, the source credibility of the sample, and the degree of agreement or
disagreement among the sources should influence the magnitude of the adjustment (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1985, 1986; Camerer and Weber, 1992). The larger the sample size, the higher the
source credibility, and the smaller the disagreement among sources, the smaller the magnitude of
adjustment and subjective probabilities will approach the stated probabilities.

Preference towards Uncertainty
The framework of expected utility theory. According to expected utility theory,
people's preferences towards risk can be different. When comparing two prospects, prospect A
(x, p; 0, 1-p) and prospect B (xp, 1; 0, 0),it is obvious that B is the certainty equivalent of
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prospect A. However, not all people see them as equal. For people who place more value on B
than A (hence prefer B to A), the suggestion is that they value a certain prospect more than an
uncertain one, and therefore that these people are risk averse. People who place more value on A
than B (hence prefer A to B) are risk seeking. Finally, people who are indifferent to the prospects
A and B are risk neutral. This concept, called risk attitude, establishes the difference between
individuals in terms of their preferences towards uncertainty. Mathematically, a person’s risk
attitude can be determined by the shape of her expected utility function (determined by x and p
together), with a concave expected utility function representing risk averse, a convex expected
utility function representing risk seeking, and a linear expected utility function representing risk
neutral. Risk attitude can be interpreted as a kind of personality, which is consistent under a
specific context. So if a person is risk averse, she will always prefer the certainty equivalent
regardless of whether p is large or small.
The framework of prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory. According to
prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory, a person’s preference towards uncertainty is
determined jointly by the value function and the weighting function. In general, a reversely Sshaped weighting function plus a concave-shaped value function for gains leads to uncertaintyseeking behavior for gaining a prize of small probabilities and uncertainty-averse behavior for
gaining a prize of large probabilities. The same shape of weighting function plus a convexshaped value function for losses leads to uncertainty-averse behavior for losing at small
probabilities and risk-seeking behavior for losing at large probabilities.
Other frameworks for decisions under uncertainty. Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,1986)
propose a pattern similar to that found in prospect theory. They assume that people are generally
defensive pessimistic about gaining something: they will overweight small probabilities and
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underweight moderate to large probabilities. Hence, they display risk-averse behavior for gaining
at small probabilities and risk-seeking behavior for gaining at moderate and large probabilities.
Kahn and Sarin (1988) do not directly describe the behavior of the majority under
uncertainty; however, they advocate the idea that a person’s preference towards uncertainty can
vary with ̅.In other words, a person’s preference towards uncertainty can depend on the
expected probability that event E will happen. A simple way of incorporating such a variation of
preference into their model is to allow a person’s attitude towards uncertainty λ to be a linear
function of ̅ . As a result, the first-order approximation of their model can be rewritten as
follows:
̅

̅

Expected utility theory acknowledges the differences across individuals in terms of
preference towards uncertainty; however, that preference should be consistent within an
individual and independent of the probability of obtaining an outcome. In contrast, behavior
theories propose that even within an individual, a change in preference towards uncertainty may
occur, depending on the level of stated probability

.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, I develop the proposition regarding consumer heterogeneity, and propose
the influences of review volume and valence for different consumers.

Online Purchase Decision: Willingness to Pay (WTP)
Assume that the reference point of a consumer before purchasing a product with
monetary value V from an online seller is 0. The purchase can be simplified to a two-outcome
prospect: a consumer is either being satisfied by the seller or not, where the value of being
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satisfied is gaining V and the value of being not satisfied is 0. Let p denote the true probability
that a consumer will be satisfied by the online seller for the transaction. The purchase decision in
terms of willingness to pay can be represented as how much the consumer is willing to pay to
purchase the prospect (V, p; 0, 1-p). Assuming that when determining the price of a prospect,
people tend to evaluate the outcome (V, p; 0, 1-p) and cost (-WTP, 1) separately (Kahneman and
Tvresky, 1979), the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) will be determined as
v(V, p; 0, 1-p) + v(-WTP) = 0
Seller review information is presented as the probability of gaining the product and being
satisfied by the seller, so the framing of a bidirectional seller review is a gaining framing. The
basic idea behind seller reviews is that a consumer does not know the true probability p that she
will be satisfied by the seller and can only use a sample to estimate p. Previous customers who
provide reviews about a seller form a sample of the population (all customers of that seller). A
bidirectional review system entails that the sample follows a binomial distribution; the review
volume N is the size of the sample; the review valence
the sample mean; and the estimator of p,

, the percentage of positive reviews, is

,is the variance of the sample mean (Wu and

Gaytan, 2010). According to prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory, the price a
consumer is willing to pay is then determined by the subjective value of the prospect (V, p ; 0, 1p ) as perceived by that consumer.
[
where

]

[

]

, and w( ) is an increasing function of
As the main focus of the current research is the weighting function, which previous

studies have theorized is the source of reversed preference towards uncertainty for gains with
different probabilities, I will set the value V at a constant level and examine a consumer’s
preference towards uncertainty using the weighting function w( , N).
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Proposition: The Shape of Weighting Function w( , N)
As discussed earlier, previous research (Wu and Ayala, 2012; Wu et al., 2012) developed
using the framework of expected utility theory assumes that uncertainty preference only differs
across individuals. While behaviorists argue that people tend to have reverse preferences towards
uncertainty for gains of small probability and for gains of large probability, List (2004) finds that
in the marketplace, prospect theory explains the behavior of inexperienced consumers well.
However, consumers with greater market experience tend to conform to the predictions of classic
expected utility theory. In market like eBay, where variety exists among consumers, it is
reasonable to expect to observe the behavioral patterns predicted by both frameworks. I extend
the previous research by allowing the differences in preference towards uncertainty to exist not
only across individuals, but also within an individual (at least for some consumers). So, the
assumption is that there is heterogeneity of consumers in the shapes of the weighting function.
First, there are consumers who consistently overweight or underweight all probabilities. For
these consumers, their preference towards uncertainty can be described by the risk attitude of
expected utility theory. Specifically, if a consumer consistently overweights all probabilities (a
concave-shaped weighting function), then she is a risk-seeking person; if a consumer
consistently underweights all probabilities (a convex-shaped weighting function), then she is a
risk-averse person; and if a consumer neither overweights nor underweights any probability (a
linear weighting function), then she is a risk-neutral person. Second, there are consumers who do
not consistently overweight or underweight probabilities. As discussed before, a reversely Sshaped weighting function has been proposed under the assumption that people are generally
defensive pessimistic about gains (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985,1986). I relax this restriction,
allowing consumers to have a weighting function that is S-shaped. Consumers who underweight
small probabilities and overweight large probabilities have weighting functions with an S shape,
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and consumers who overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities have
weighting functions with a reversed S shape. For consumers with either an S-shaped or reversely
S-shaped weighting function, there exists a cross-over point (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, 1986)
where w( , N) =

.

Proposition. A consumer’s weighting function is
a. concave if she overweights all probabilities.
b. convex if she underweights all probabilities.
c. linear if she neither overweights nor underweights any probability.
d. S-shaped if she underweights small probabilities and overweights large
probabilities.
e. reversely S-shaped if she overweights small probabilities and underweights large
probabilities.

Hypothesis 1: The Impact of Seller Review (SR) Valence (p’) on Willingness to Pay
Review valence is the stated probability obtained from a sample and is used to estimate
the true probability of obtaining outcome v(V). Consistent with the underlying assumption of
previous behavioral studies that the weighting function should be an increasing function of the
stated probability, the weighting function w( , N) should be an increasing function of review
valence
H1.

. Hence the impact of review valence

on WTP should be positive for all consumers.

For a seller with a higher SR valence ( ), a consumer is willing to pay a higher
price regardless of the shape of the consumer’s weighting function.
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Hypothesis 2: The Impact of Seller Review Volume (N) on Willingness to Pay
Review volume N is the size of the sample from which review valence

is obtained. The

larger N is, the smaller the magnitude of overweighting/underweighting. As a result, the impact
of review volume on WTP depends on whether a consumer overweights or underweights the
review valence. For consumers who consistently overweight or underweight probabilities, the
impact of review volume on WTP is consistent, either negative, positive, or insignificant. For
consumers who do not consistently overweight/underweight, the impact of review volume N is
determined by the shape of a consumer’s weighting function and by the level of review valence,
specifically, whether valence is below or above the cross-over point.
H2. For a seller with a higher SR volume (N), a consumer is willing to pay
a. a lower price if the consumer has a concave-shaped weighting function.
b. a higher price if the consumer has a convex-shaped weighting function.
c. an equal price if the consumer has a linear-shaped weighting function.
d1. a higher price if the consumer has an S-shaped weighting function and the SR
valence ( ) is below the cross-over point.
d2. a lower price if the consumer has an S-shaped weighting function and the SR
valence ( ) is above the cross-over point.
e1. a lower price if the consumer has a reversely S-shaped weighting function and the
SR valence ( ) is below the cross-over point.
e2. a higher price if the consumer has a reversely S-shaped weighting function and the
SR valence ( ) is above the cross-over point.
The overall conceptual framework is shown below.
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H1

SR Valence ( p’ )

Willingness to Pay ( WTP )
H2

SR Volume ( N )

Weighting Function ( w(p’, N) )

P

Figure 2.5 Conceptual Framework

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Study Design
Subjects are asked to consider a purchase scenario in which they are about to purchase a
42” LCD TV on a website. The TV is sold at local retail stores for $800. On the website, there
are multiple sellers selling the new TV and the website provides reviews for each seller. Seller
review has a bidirectional format, as shown below.
The review volume has three levels: 20, 50, and 200, and the review valence has eleven
levels: 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 100%. Each subject was
provided with 33 seller profiles having different combinations of levels of volume and valence.
Four versions of the survey were developed to counterbalance the order in which volumes and
valences were shown to the subjects.

Data Collection Procedure
One-hundred forty-three business-school students at a southern public university were
recruited for the study. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the
survey. Subjects were asked to provide the maximum price they were willing to pay each seller
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for the product; the lowest price they could pay was $0. Three seller profiles appeared twice in
the survey to test the inner reliability of the answers provided by each subject. These profiles
were (20, 50%), (50, 50%), and (200, 50%), and appeared in the middle and then the end of the
survey.

Figure 2.6 Experiment Study Design Snapshot

Analyses
Internal reliability. Internal reliability was assessed on the repeated seller profiles using
the Pearson Correlation test. Subjects with a Pearson Correlation value below 0.8 were removed
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from the dataset. For subjects who could not be tested using Pearson Correlation because they
had the same reported WTP for different sellers, the pattern of reported WTP based on review
volume was observed. Subjects with dramatic pattern changes, such as a reversed preference on
review volume between the test and re-test sets, were removed from the dataset.
Assess the shape of weighting function. The following model was used to estimate the
weighting function for each subject:

where a, b, and c are parameters, and i represents the ith individual
Because product value is set at a constant level, I use an intercept, c, to capture the
deviation of the subjective product value from the objective product price.
The weighting function combines ideas from Kahn and Sarin (1988) and Einhorn and
Hogarth (1985, 1986), adopting the form used by Kahn and Sarin (1988). Both studies state that
the sample variance of random variable p’ will positively impact the magnitude of uncertainty.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, 1986) also propose that magnitude is negatively associated with
factors such as sample size and source credibility. As source credibility is not the focus of my
dissertation, my weighting function model is only a function of sample variance
sample size N. The term

and

describesa subject’s attitude towards uncertainty as a function

of p’, which allows the attitude to change at different levels of p’.
A slight modification was made without changing the properties of the function shapes. I
use sample variance instead of standard deviation, used by Kahn and Sarin (1988). I chose this
model specification for several reasons. First, the model directly incorporates the variables in
which I am interested into the estimating weighting function. Second, the model can
accommodate all five types of shapes. Lastly, using variance, the shape of the weighting function
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can be directly determined by the estimates of parameters a and b. Subjects with the same shape
of weighting function were then grouped together. For the S-shaped and reversely S-shaped
weighting functions, the cross-over point is

. Table 2.3 below shows how to use estimates of

a and b to determine the shape of the weighting function for each subject.
Table 2.3 Estimation of the Shape of Weighting Function
Group w(p) Shape

Description

Parameters
b=0 and a<0,
b>0 and a/b≤ -1,
b<0 and a/b≥ 0
b=0 and a>0,
b>0 and a/b≥ 0,
b<0 and a/b≤ -1
a = 0 and b = 0

1

Concave

Overweight all probabilities

2

Convex

Underweight all probabilities

3

Linear

Neither underweight nor overweight probabilities

4

S-Shaped

Underweight small probabilities
Overweight large probabilities

b < 0 and -1< a/b < 0

5

Reversely
S-Shaped

Overweight small probabilities
Underweight large small probabilities

b > 0 and -1 < a/b < 0

Assess the impact of seller review valence and volume. The impact of SR valence and
SR volume on WTP were assessed at the group level. For each group, formed by the shape of the
weighting function, a linear regression was performed to test the impacts of valence and volume.
I used a linear-log function because it was used in previous empirical research to test the
relationship between seller reputation and price (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Melnik and Alm, 2002;
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2011).The main reason for using a linear-log as
opposed to a linear function is that it can capture the diminishing return of reputation on price as
the seller reputation increases (Livingston, 2005; Obloj and Capron, 2011). For the S-shaped and
reversely S-shaped weighting function groups, separate linear regressions were used to fit the
data that fell below or above the cross-over point.
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(

)

where i identifies the ith individual, j represents the jth group, and k denotes below or above crossover point.

Results
Internal reliability. Twenty-eight of the one-hundred forty-three students did not pass
the internal reliability test and hence were removed from the original dataset. Examples of
answers from those subjects are shown in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.7 Examples of Subjects Removed from the Data

56

The shapes of weighting function. All five groups of weighting function shapes were
identified, supporting the proposition. For those subjects who consistently
overweight/underweight all probabilities, 10 subjects have concave-shaped weighting functions
corresponding to a risk-seeking attitude, 7 have convex-shaped weighting functions
corresponding to a risk-averse attitude, and 22 subjects have linear-shaped weighting functions
corresponding to a risk-neutral attitude. For those subjects who do not consistently
overweight/underweight probabilities, 25 have S-shaped weighting functions and 51 have
reversely S-shaped weighting functions. The plots of weighting functions by groups are provided
in Figure 2.8.

Figure 2.8 Plot of Weighting Functions at Group Levels
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The impact of seller review valence and volume. R-square at the group level ranges
from .206 for the linear weighting function group to .505 for the S-shaped weighting function
group above the cross-over point. Supporting H2, the SR valence has a positive impact on WTP
(p-value = .000) for all groups.
As expected, the impact of SR volume on WTP varies across groups. For the concave
group, SR volume has a negative impact on WTP (βN= –1.005 with significance at .000).For the
convex group, SR volume has a positive impact on WTP (βN= .296 with significance at .059).For
the linear group, SR volume has no impact on WTP (βN= –.194 with significance at .139).For the
S-shaped group, SR volume has no impact on WTP(βN= –.027 with significance at .874) below
the cross-over point, which is not consistent with the hypothesis, but the impact of SR volume is
consistent with the hypothesis above the cross-over point (βN= –.184 with significance at
.015).For the reversely S-shaped group, SR volume has a negative impact on WTP below the
cross-over point (βN= –.542 with significance at .000) and a positive impact above the cross-over
point(βN= .107 with significance at .030). In general, all hypotheses are supported excepted for
the impact of SR volume on WTP for the S-shaped group when the SR valences are below the
cross-over point. The detailed results are shown in Table 2.4.

DISCUSSION
The results from the experimental study provide relatively strong support for the
hypotheses. First, the data confirm that the impact of seller review volume on WTP not only
varies across individuals, as maintained by previous research, but also, for some consumers,
within an individual depending on the level of review valence. Second, the impact of review
volume on WTP is much more complex than previously proposed, because a consumer can
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Table 2.4 The Impact of Online Reviews on Consumers’ WTP

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Coefficient Std. Error
t-Stat
p-value
Hypothesis
Concave Group (overweight)
-1.005
0.175
-5.748
0.000
Support
Log(N)
0.834
0.110
7.608
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.386
R-square
10
Student #
Convex Group (underweight)
0.296
0.155
1.905
0.059
Marginal Support
Log(N)
2.937
0.358
8.211
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.498
R-square
7
Student #
Linear Group (neither underweight nor overweight)
-0.194
0.131
-1.481
0.139
Support
Log(N)
1.387
0.148
9.381
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.260
R-square
22
Student #
S-Shaped Group
Below cross-over point (underweight)
-0.027
0.168
-0.158
0.874
Not Support
Log(N)
1.207
0.181
6.651
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.324
R-square
Above cross-over point (overweight)
-0.184
0.076
-2.440
0.015
Support
Log(N)
2.055
0.343
5.998
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.285
R-square
25
Student #
Reversely S-Shaped Group
Below cross-over point (overweight)
-0.542
0.081
-6.717
0.000
Support
Log(N)
0.359
0.045
8.044
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.405
R-square
Above cross-over point (underweight)
0.107
0.049
2.173
0.030
Support
Log(N)
2.591
0.195
13.276
0.000
Support
Log(p’)
0.505
R-square
51
Student #
With dummy variables for individuals

overweight/underweight small/large probabilities or have a reversed pattern. Hence, the
influence of volume on WTP can exhibit different patterns among consumers.
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In the next essay, I assess the external validity of the framework. I have collected
transactional data for Playstation 2 game consoles sold on eBay.com. I expect that the analysis of
the empirical data will be much more difficult. Specifically, some covariate variables may need
to be controlled. Therefore, additional information related to transactions will be recorded, such
as the feedback score (review valence) for consumers who provide reviews to sellers, the time
during the day at which the auction ends, the shipping options and other services provided by the
seller, and so on. In contrast to the experimental data, it is also difficult to obtain multiple
instances of data at the individual level to empirically assess the shape of the weighting function
for each individual. Therefore, I plan to conduct my analyses at the segment level. First,
consumers can be classified into the different groups using a finite mixture regression model.
Second, the linear regression will be performed for each group just as it was for the experimental
data. I demonstrate the technique of separating latent consumer groups with the proposed
weighting function model, and present the results of the hypotheses testing for each group.
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ESSAY THREE. ONLINE REVIEWS AND CONSUMERS WILLINGNESS
TO PAY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION
Motivation
Websites like eBay heavily depend on their review systems to build trustworthy
marketplaces. However, as discussed in Essay One, we still lack clear evidence concerning how
consumers use reviews in their purchase decisions for these markets. Many studies examine
ratings that combine review volume and review valence, for example, the “Feedback Score”
provided by eBay, but these studies have produced mixed results. To understand the role of
reviews in consumers’ decision-making processes, it is very important to look at the influence of
review valence and review volume separately, the possible interaction between them (Khare et
al., 2011; Park et al., 2012), and consumer heterogeneity related to online reviews (Sun, 2012;
Wu and Ayala, 2012)
In Essay Two, I proposed that heterogeneity exists among consumers when using seller
review information to determine willingness to pay. As a result, there are different interaction
patterns between review valence and review volume. While seller review valence should always
positively influence consumers’ willingness to pay, review volume varies among consumers, and
the preference towards review volume can be described by a consumer’s weighting function.
Combining classic expected utility and prospect theory frameworks, I proposed five shapes of
weighting functions: concave, convex, linear, S-shaped, and reversely S-shaped. In an
experimental study, I suggested that the preference towards review volume can be very complex.
Not only can consumers have totally opposite preferences towards review volume, for some,
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their preferences also can change according to review valence. My hypotheses are summarized in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Weighting
Group Function
Shape
1
Concave
2
Convex
3

Linear

Description
Overweight all probabilities
Underweight all probabilities
Neither underweight nor
overweight probabilities

4

S-Shaped

Underweight small
probabilities;
Overweight large probabilities

5

Reversely
S-Shaped

Overweight small
probabilities;
Underweight large small
probabilities

H1. Impact of
Review Valence
p’ on WTP
+
+

H2. Impact of
Review Volume
N on WTP

+

No impact

+

+

+

+
Below cross-over point
−
Above cross-over point
−
Below cross-over point
+
Above cross-over point

There are several important considerations that motivate my empirical study. First,
testing my theory in online markets is the common approach for establishing its external validity,
and thus the relevance of my proposed theory for managerial implications. Second, online
markets differ from a lab setting in many aspects. Consumers have different decision goals and
processes; furthermore, seller reviews pose different and more challenging distributions. For
example, the majority of sellers have review valences close to 100%. On one hand, studies find
that people are biased when they process review information, placing more emphasis on review
valence and underweighting review volume (Wolf and Muhanna, 2011). On the other hand,
because of the large number of high review valences, it becomes less effective in separating good
sellers from bad; hence, its impact on price premium becomes less significant (Bockstedt and
Goh, 2011). Third, researchers often observe only a few transactions for a given time window.

62

This approach requires different statistical techniques for constructing variables and analyzing
data than those used in my lab setting, which I will elaborate later in this essay.
To provide insightful managerial implications, it is important to test whether the
proposed heterogeneity exists in the real online market, and thereby establish the external
validity of the framework. Thus, I will test my hypotheses with online transaction data collected
from eBay.com. As discussed in Essay Two, it may be difficult to estimate a consumer’s
weighting function individually when the data lacks sufficient observations from a single
consumer. Also, to accommodate consumer differences and at the same time achieve economic
efficiency, marketing strategies and activities are often directed toward segments rather than
individuals. Hence, for online transactional data, it is more practical to test hypotheses atthe
group level. Consistent with the method used in Wu and Ayala (2012), I will first use a finite
mixture regression model to segment consumers based on their weighing functions and then test
the hypotheses for each group.
This essay contains the following sections. First, I introduce the method, finite mixture
regression models, which allows me to simultaneously classify observations into groups using
the weighing function model and estimate the parameters for each group. Second, I describe a
simulation study that demonstrates the ability of finite mixture regression models to identify the
underlying true weighting functions of different groups. Third, I explain my adoption of this
method to test the hypotheses with online transaction data. Last, I discuss the study results and
future research.

Method
For decades, marketers have used finite mixture regression models, also known as latent
class regression models (DeSarbo and Cron, 1988), to identify different segments of consumers
63

whose preferences for marketing information vary. Finite mixture regression models,under the
maximum likelihood framework, use the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to segment
observations into different groups and provide maximum likelihood estimates for model
parameters for each group. Based on Frühwirth-Schnatter (2006) and Leisch (2004), the
definitions and principles of finite mixture regression models are explained below.1
A random variable Y is sampled from a population comprised of K subgroups (usually
called components), but group indicators not recorded. All group densities come from the same
parametric distribution family with density f(θ), where parameter θ differs across groups. Then
the conditional density of Y can be shown as below:
|
,∑

where

|

∑

,

, h is the conditional density of

y, x is a vector of independent variables, πk(also called weight distribution) is the prior
probability of component k, θk is the component-specific parameter vector for the density
function f, and

is the vector of all parameters.

The posterior probability that an observation belongs to component j is specified below.
Data can then be segmented by assigning each observation to the component with the maximum
posterior probability.
|

|
∑

|

The log-likelihood of a sample of N observations is given by the equation below. Because
the posterior probability usually cannot be estimated directly, the EM algorithm is used to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters.
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|

∑

∑

∑

|

The EM algorithm can be used to compute maximum likelihood estimates for incomplete data
for which the group indicator is missing. Each iteration of the EM algorithm involves an
expectation step (E-step) followed by a maximization step (M-step) (Dempster et al., 1977).
E-step estimates the posterior probability for each observation:
̂

|

̅

and updates prior probability for each component:
̂

∑

̂

M-step uses the posterior probabilities of each observation as weights for calculating the
maximum likelihood estimate for each component:
∑

|

The iteration is repeated until likelihood improvement falls below a pre-specified value or the
iteration reaches a maximum number.
In the next section, I explain how a finite mixture regression model was used to separate
subjects from simulated samples. The “Flexmix” package (Leisch, 2004) designed for R software
was used to apply the finite mixture regression model.

A SIMULATION STUDY
The purpose of the simulation is to assess the ability of the finite mixture model to
separate subjects with different weighting functions. The proposed theoretical model for
measuring a subject’s attitude weighting function is shown below:
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where WTP is the willingness to pay, V is the product value, p’ is seller review valence, and N is
seller review volume. This model can be fitted regularly as a polynomial regression. However,
only three parameters, a, b, and c, need to be estimated; therefore, I used a linear instead of a
polynomial regression, as shown in the equation below.

As in Essay Two, the shape of the weighting function is determined by the estimations of
parameters a and b, as shown in Table 2.3.For groups 4 and 5, the cross-over point is determined
by –a/b.

Simulation Data
In this section, I discuss the data used for the simulation.
Data generation. I used the following steps to generate data for each variable:
Review valence p’: a random variable that follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1
Review number N: a random variable that follows a uniform distribution between 1 and
2,000
Product value V: $800.00
Error ε: a random variable that follows a standard normal distribution
Sample size. In Essay Two, I proposed that there are five types of weighting functions.
For this simulation, I generated 500 observations for each group; hence the total sample size of
the simulated data is 2500.
Parameters. The parameters for each group are shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Summary of Simulated Parameters
Parameters
c
a
b
1
Concave
0
0
20
2
Convex
0
20
0
3
Linear
0
0
0
4
S-Shaped*
0
20
40
5
Reversely S-Shaped*
0
40
20
*The cross-over point for both S-shaped and reversely S-shaped groups is 0.5.
Group

Shape

Testing Scheme
I created five subsets of the simulated data. Subset 1 contained subjects from group 3;
subset 2 contained subjects from groups 2 and 3; subset 3 contained subjects from groups 1, 2,
and 3; subset 4 contained subjects from groups 1, 2, 3, and 4; and the last subset, 5, contained all
of the subjects in the simulated data. The composition of each subset is shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Summary of Subsets of Simulated Data
Subset
1
2
3
4
5

Groups included in the data
Group 3
Group 3, Group 2
Group 3, Group 2, Group 1
Group 3, Group 2, Group 1, Group 4
Group 3, Group 2, Group 1, Group 4, Group 5

Size
500
1000
1500
2000
2500

A finite mixture regression model was applied to each subset to estimate the parameters
for that subset.

Results
The finite mixture regression model generated multiple models with different numbers of
components. Under the maximum likelihood framework, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
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(Akaike, 1974) can be used to choose the best model. As shown below, AIC accounts for both
likelihood and model complexity.

where L is the likelihood function of the model and d is the number of parameters in the model.
For each subset, the model with the minimum AIC value was selected. For the first four
subsets, the finite mixture regression model successfully identified the number of groups
embedded in the data. For subset 5, the finite mixture regression model identified six groups
instead of five; the extra group, however, had a very small size of 8 observations. See Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Summary of Selected Models from Each Subset
Subset
1
2
3
4
5

Data
G3
G3, G2
G3, G2, G1
G3, G2, G1,G4
G3, G2, G1,G4, G5

Component
1
2
3
4
6

Log Likelihood
713.5234
1758.183
3031.585
4106.782
5210.928

d.f.
4
9
14
19
24

AIC
1435.047
3534.366
6091.170
8251.564
10469.860

Parameter estimation. For each subset, the parameters estimated for each group are
shown in Table 3.5. The finite mixture regression model successfully identified all of the groups,
and for each group, the estimates were very close to the true value of the parameters. For subset
5, the finite mixture regression model generated6 components; the extra component, component
4, belonged to group 4. Furthermore, the estimates of component 4 were different from the true
parameters of group 4. Again, the extra component only had 8 observations, and this result
probably was due to random errors.
Hit ratio. The hit ratio for each subset is shown below. When the data contained only one
group, the finite mixture regression model correctly identified the group. As one group at a time
was added to the data, the overall hit ratio decreased from 100% to 56.92%.
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Table 3.5 Parameter Estimations for Simulated Data
Data

Component

Size

Group

G3

1

500

G3

1

474

G3

2

526

G2

1

493

G1

2

522

G2

3

485

G3

1

483

G4

2

568

G2

3

454

G3

4

495

G1

1

554

G1

2

378

G5

3

245

G3

4

8

G4

5

656

G2

6

659

G4

G3, G2

G3,
G2, G1

G3,
G2,
G1, G4

G3,
G2,
G1,
G4, G5

Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb

Coefficient
0.075
0.151
0.085
0.168
19.978
0.020
19.960
0.112
19.978
0.020
0.079
0.158
19.988
39.987
19.980
0.027
0.070
0.150
19.964
0.104
19.959
0.115
19.928
39.838
0.062
0.134
0.507
0.547
19.977
0.015
19.988
39.988

Std. Error
0.079
0.155
0.076
0.150
0.068
0.186
0.077
0.150
0.067
0.184
0.071
0.139
0.066
0.129
0.066
0.182
0.072
0.142
0.077
0.150
0.078
0.151
0.126
0.247
0.084
0.164
0.092
0.148
0.068
0.186
0.064
0.123

Z Value
0.954
0.975
1.110
1.121
294.661
0.110
259.538
0.744
296.825
0.106
1.120
1.140
301.679
311.025
300.862
0.148
0.967
1.055
260.096
0.692
257.394
0.759
157.718
161.320
0.728
0.816
5.505
3.691
294.868
0.080
310.890
324.673

P
0.340
0.329
0.267
0.263
0.000
0.912
0.000
0.457
0.000
0.915
0.263
0.254
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.882
0.333
0.291
0.000
0.489
0.000
0.448
0.000
0.000
0.466
0.414
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.936
0.000
0.000

However, in comparison with the hit ratio of random assignment of subjects to groups,
the advantage of the finite mixture regression model became more salient as the number of
groups increased. When the data included all five groups, the hit ratio of the finite mixture
regression model was almost three times that of the hit ratio of random assignment.
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Table 3.6 Hit Ratios of Selected Models
Data

Group
G1

G3

G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Overall

G3,G2,G1

G3,G2,G1,G4

G3,G1,G2,G4,G5

G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Overall
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Overall

G5

100%

100%

G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Overall
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
Overall

Hit Ratio

500

G1

G3, G2

Component
G2
G3
G4

G2

G3

441
85

59
415

G4

G5
88.20%
83.00%

85.60%
G1
416
14
63

G2
15
432
75

G3
69
54
362

G4

G5
83.20%
86.40%
72.40%

80.67%
G1
388
8
46
53

G2
16
406
66
80

G3
48
29
267
110

G4
48
57
121
257

G5
77.60%
81.20%
53.40%
51.40%
65.90%

G1
371
7
43
55
78

G2
24
395
63
84
90
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G3
10
7
154
42
32

G4
61
71
154
292
89

G5
34
20
86
27
211

74.20%
79.00%
30.80%
58.40%
42.20%
56.92%

Table 3.7 Comparison of Finite Mixture Regression Model and Random Assignment
Data
G3
G3, G2
G3, G2, G1
G3, G2, G1, G4
G3, G2, G1, G4, G5

Hit Ratio of
Finite Mixture Regression Model
100.00%
85.60%
80.67%
65.90%
56.92%

Hit Ratio of
Random Assignment
100.00%
50.00%
33.33%
25.00%
20.00%

Discussion
The simulation study shows that the finite mixture regression model was very effective at
separating subjects into different groups and identifying the true parameters of each group. As
the number of underlying groups increased, the method became even more superior.
At the same time, I acknowledge the challenges of using a finite mixture regression
model in this particular case. First, the regression model is complex, as shown by the hit ratio,
which dropped dramatically as the model’s complexity increased. When a quadratic term was
introduced to the model by adding the convex group (G2) to the linear group (G3), the hit ratio
dropped about 15%, from 100% to 85.6%. Also, when a cubic term was introduced to the model
by adding the S-shaped group (G4), again, the hit ratio dropped about 15%, from 80.67% to
65.9%. However, if the model already contained a quadratic or cubic term, adding another term
of the same power (G1 and G5) led to much smaller decreases in hit ratio. Second, for my
simulation data, I generated review valences based on a uniform distribution; however, as
discussed in the previous section, samples drawn from eBay usually have high review valences.
Sellers who have low review valences either exit the market or change their IDs and rebuild their
review profile (Lin et al., 2006; Abbasi et al., 2008). Such a skewed distribution of review
valences limits the ability of the finite mixture regression model to identify the true underlying
parameters.
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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
eBay’s Review System
eBay’s rating system has gone through several changes since it was introduced. At the
time the data for this study was collected, eBay’s review system worked in the following way: A
buyer could submit feedback to a seller after each transaction; the feedback could be positive,
neutral, or negative. eBay then provided a statistical summary for each member. The “Feedback
Score” equaled the number of positive minus the number of negative reviews. The “Positive
Feedback Percentage” was the number of positive reviews divided by the sum of positive and
negative reviews a member had received in the last 12 months. Both numbers were displayed by
the member’s login ID, so when a buyer reviewed the auction, she could see the statistics on the
same page as the product information. If she clicked the link to visit the seller’s profile page, she
could view additional information, including the number of positive, neutral, and negative
reviews that the seller had received in the past 1, 6, and 12 months; the ratings of the seller for
criteria such as communication and shipping time; and detailed comments left by previous
customers along with the product they purchased from this seller.

Data Collection
I collected transaction data for anew PlayStation 2 sold on eBay between September and
November in 2009. The PlayStation 2 was sold for $299 dollars, and the offline list price did not
change during the period of data collection. For each auction, I collected the description of the
product; auction information such as shipping policy, return policy, payment policy, etc.; bidding
history; and seller profile. Originally, 678 observations were collected; however, some were
removed from the data for various reasons. First, some auctions did not result in sales, which led
to invalid transactions. Second, some sellers had reviews that were 100% positive, because the
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positive percentage was calculated based on reviews left within a year. Relying on reviews
submitted within a year to calculate the positive percentage significantly increased the proportion
of sellers with 100% positive responses. To reduce this bias, I removed the observation if a
seller’s positive percentage was 100% but her most recent 200 reviews were not uniformly
positive. Third, some sellers had 100% positive reviews, but had never sold an item on eBay
before, accumulating all of their positive reviews from previous purchases on eBay. Research
has shown that reviews for a seller’s purchase behavior do not influence purchase price (Zhang,
2006); hence I removed the observation if a seller had never sold a product on eBay prior to the
transaction recorded. As a result, I deleted 157 observations, and the final data set contained 529
observations.

Variables
Willingness to pay. Similar to the approach used by Sun and Liu (2010), the winning bid
plus the shipping cost were totaled to measure a buyer’s willingness to pay for the product. It is
reasonable to consider shipping cost when measuring willingness to pay, because when an eBay
consumer wins an auction, the amount paid will include the bid price and the shipping cost
charged by the seller. Previous research has shown that consumers will consider shipping cost
when they participate in auctions and auctions with higher shipping costs usually result in lower
final bidding prices (Bockstedt and Goh, 2011).
Review volume N. eBay provided a feedback score for each member, which was the
difference between the number of positive and negative reviews, instead of the total number of
reviews. As discussed above, the feedback score contains information about the review volume
and the review valence, which is insufficient for explaining the relationship between reviews and
price premium. To consider review valence and review volume separately, and to avoid
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confounding the two constructs, I measured review volume by estimating the total number of
reviews a seller had. Using a formula based on feedback score and positive review percentage, I
calculated the number of reviews as shown below:

Review valence p’. Review valence is equivalent to the percentage of positive reviews,
which was provided by eBay.
Control variables. Variables that also may influence willingness to pay were included in
the model as control variables. Some items were featured, or displayed at the top of search
results, and some items had special features, such as a warranty. Specialty items may influence
the final price because consumers may perceive them as more valuable or less risky than the
regular items. Zhou et al. (2009) found that offering a full warranty for the product significantly
increases the auction price, and Bockstedt and Goh (2011) found that featured items are sold at a
higher price than non-featured items. Therefore, I included a dummy variable, “Specialty,”
which indicated whether the auction item was listed as a featured item or had special features: 0
denoted a regular item and 1 denoted a specialty item.
Acceptance of returned products reduces the risk associated with a purchase; hence,
consumers may pay less for a product if it's non-returnable. I used a dummy variable, “Return,”
to indicate the return policy of a seller, with 0 denoting that returns were accepted or that
information was not provided, and 1 denoting that the seller did not accept returns.
Suter and Hardesty (2005) found that the number of bidders increases as the starting bid
set by the seller increases, and as a result, seller's earnings increase. Kamins et al. (2004), who
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proposed the opposite influence of the starting bid on final price, found that the number of
bidders consistently has a positive influence on final bidding price, fully mediating the
relationship between the starting bid and the final price. As previous research has shown that the
number of bidders in fluencies the final price, I included a variable, “Bidders,” to account for this
effect.
It also has been shown that auctions ending during peak time generally have higher
closing prices, and that consumers pay more attention to auctions during its closing period
regardless of the length or closing day of the auction (Melnik and Alm, 2002).Based on that
research, I used a dummy variable, “Hour,” to indicate the peak period of transactions. A value
of0 indicated that the auction ended sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. central standard
time (CST), and that during this period, there were on average 5.3transactionsper hour. A value
of 1 indicated that the auction ended between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. CST, and that there were
on average 32.1 transactions per hour.
Previous studies also have considered the impact of time on product value (Park et al.,
2012).The data were collected throughout the three months, and even though the list price of the
product did not change during this period, the perceived value of the product could, especially as
the holiday season approached. Similar to the approach taken by Wu and Ayala (2012), I used
two dummy variables to account for the monthly fluctuation of the perceived value of the
product due to external market conditions. One dummy variable indicated auctions that ended in
October, and the other indicated auctions that ended in November.
A summary of the variables and a description of the data are shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9,
respectively.
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Table 3.8 Summary of Empirical Data Variables
Variable
WTP
N
p’
Specialty
Return
Bidders
Hour
Month10
Month11

Measure
Final Bid plus Shipping Fee charged by the seller
Review Volume
Review Valence
Whether the item was listed as a featured item on eBay:
0 means no and 1 means yes
Seller’s return policy:0 means either accepts returns or does not provide
information about return policy and 1 means does not accept return
The number of bidders who bid in the auction
0: low transaction period from 23:00 to 8:59 CST
1: high transaction period from 9:00 to 22:59 CST
0: auction did not end in October; 1: auction ended in October
0: auction did not end in November; 1: auction ended in November

Table 3.9 Empirical Data Description
Variable
WTP
N
p’
Bidders
Specialty
Return
Hour
Month10
Month11

Mean
302.74
825.45
0.9916
10
Number of 0
482
306
48
343
383

Std. Deviation
19.16
1551.6
0.0163
4.45
Number of 1
47
223
481
186
146

Analyses
I used a finite mixture regression model to segment 529 observations into different
groups,and linear regression models for the observations in each group to test the hypothesis
with respect to that group. The models for classifying observations and testing hypotheses are
shown below.
Classification model. To classify observations, I used the model proposed in Essay Two,
with the addition of the control variables.
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where

,

,
, and i: ithobservation

Hypothesis testing model. To test the hypothesis, I used a linear-log function of reviews
plus the control variables.2As in Essay Two, a linear-log function, was used to instead of a linear
function, can capture this diminished return of reputation.

i: ithobservation, j: jth group, k: below or above cross-over point

Aggregate Analysis Results
I ran the hypothesis model with all 529 observations, assuming that there is no difference
among consumers in terms of preference towards review volume. Table 3.10 presents the results
of the analysis at the aggregate level.
Table 3.10 Aggregate Analysis Results
Variable
Review Valence p’
Review Volume N

Coefficient
0.728
0.005

Std. Error
0.146
0.001

t value
4.979
3.623

P value
0.000
0.000

At the aggregate level, both review valence and review volume had significant positive
impacts on consumers’ willingness to pay.
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Classification Results
To identify the optimal model, I initially set the pre-specified number of componentsto1,
and then increased it to 10one setting at a time. The largest number of components the finite
mixture regression model identified was8. The best component models are shown in Table 3.11.
I selected the model with the smallest AIC; hence, the 7-component model was selected based on
the classification model.
Table 3.11 Model Selection for Empirical Data
Model
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

# of Components
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Log likelihood
2255.931
2201.223
2173.237
2152.760
2137.532
2115.566
2098.094
2089.303

d.f.
10
21
32
43
54
65
76
87

AIC
4531.863
4444.446
4410.475
4391.519
4383.064
4361.132
4348.188
4352.607

The 7-component model identified 3 out of 5 groups: 20.6% of the consumers belonged
to the linear group, 38.2% were S-shaped, and 41.2% were reversely S-shaped. Consistent with
the literature and experimental study in Essay Two, the reversely S-shaped group was the largest.
For the S-shaped group, all observations were located above the cross-over point, so within the
range of the sample, the S-shaped group can be considered a convex group. Detailed information
for the 7-component model is shown in Table 3.12.

Hypothesis Testing Results
Below I discuss the impact of review valence and the impact of review volume
separately.
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Table 3.12 7-Component Model Parameter Estimations
Component

Size

Group

1

54

G3

2

55

G3

3

112

G5

4

59

G5

5

70

G4

6

132

G4

7

47

G5

Coefficient
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb
Xa
Xb

6225.269
6450.339
610.529
661.048
1296.158
1355.640
2685.200
2853.300
636.825
714.567
1086.973
1231.051
1180.900
1259.600

Std.
Z Value
Error
5053.500
1.232
5293.242
1.219
2268.808
0.269
2397.805
0.276
275.667
4.702
293.296
4.622
93.154 28.826
99.621
28.641
201.779
3.156
214.832
3.326
305.676
3.556
327.791
3.756
95.125 12.414
100.720
12.506

P
0.218
0.223
0.788
0.783
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Cross-over
Point
NA
NA
0.9561
0.9411
0.8912
0.8830
0.9375

The impact of review valence p’. The results showed that, in general, review valence p’
had a significant positive impact on consumers’ willingness to pay. However, in a result
inconsistent with the hypothesis, review valence had no impact on willingness to pay for the
linear weighting group, and had a negative influence for the reversely S-shaped weighting group
when it was below the cross-over point. For the rest of the consumers, as held by the hypotheses,
review valence showed a positive influence on willingness to pay. With respect to the linear
shaped weighting group, out of 109 observations, 53 had a 100% review valence. Therefore,
even though the impact of review valence was insignificant, the positive coefficient was still a
strong sign of its positive impact on willingness to pay.
The impact of review volume N. As expected, the impact of review volume on
willingness to pay varied among groups. Consistent with the hypotheses, review volume had no
impact on willingness to pay for the linear shaped weighting group. For the S-shaped weighting
group, review volume showed a negative influence on willingness to pay when review valence
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was above the cross-over point, although such an effect was statistically insignificant. For the
reversely S-shaped weighting group, review volume had a negative impact on willingness to pay
when the valence was below the cross-over point, but a positive impact when it was above. Table
3.13 presents the results of the hypothesis testing.
Table 3.13 Hypothesis Testing Result Summary
Variable

Group
Coefficient Std. Error t Value
P
Hypothesis
G3
0.156
0.410
0.380
0.705
RD*
G4
0.244
0.120
2.031
0.044
S
Review Above Cross-over Point
Valence
G5
0.447
0.022
NS
1.631
3.652
p’
Below Cross-over Point
G5
2.136
0.197
10.856
0.000
S
Above Cross-over Point
G3
0.004
0.005
0.821
0.414
S
G4
0.001
0.311
RD
0.001
1.015
Review Above Cross-over Point
Volume
G5
0.008
0.007
S
0.039
5.002
N
Below Cross-over Point
G5
0.006
0.001
4.364
0.000
S
Above Cross-over Point
* RD: Estimate had same sign as proposed by hypothesis, but effect was not significant.
S: Hypothesis was supported at significant level of 0.05.
NS: Hypothesis was not supported at significant level of 0.05.

DISCUSSION
Both the experimental and empirical studies confirmed that consumer heterogeneity
exists and influences the way that consumers use seller review information in their purchase
decisions. Although the empirical study only identified3 out of the 5 groups originally proposed,
it showed that consumers can be very different in their preferences towards review volume: some
consumers simply do not care much about review volume, some consumers have relatively stable
preferences towards review volume, and some consumers will change their preferences towards
review volume based on review valence. On the aggregate level, my empirical data showed that
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review volume has a positive effect on consumers’ willingness to pay, because the majority of
the observations fell in the reversely S-shaped group and review valence was above the crossover point. I expect that the relationship between review volume and consumers’ willingness to
pay will change if the sample’s composition changes. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
inconsistent observations of the influence of review volume on an aggregate level when the
conclusions are drawn from different samples.
The limitation of the current empirical study is that the data collection period was not
long enough to identify sellers with low review valences, because these sellers may eventually be
eliminated by the market. As a result, the distribution of review valence was negatively skewed,
and it is hard to identify observations below the cross-over points for the S-shaped and reversely
S-shaped groups. Future research can improve the validity of the framework by adopting a larger
and more representative set of data.
My research provides a descriptive framework that shows that consumers have different
preferences towards review volume and, furthermore, that such differences can be categorized by
consumers’ weighting functions. My studies establish correlation rather than a causal
relationship between weighting function and the impact of review volume on willingness to pay.
Future studies can establish a causal relationship by developing independent measurements of
weighting functions.
Finally, the current framework was developed under the binary review format; thus it
only considers review volume and valence. Future research can extend the framework to include
a continuous review format, such as Amazon.com’s, and incorporate the influence of review
variance on consumers’ willingness to pay.
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Notes
1. Formulas for finite mixture models are consistent with those shown in Leish (2004).
2. For the observations in group 5 that were below the cross-over point, covariant variables
were excluded due to the small sample size.
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